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At-speed functional tests are an important part of the manufacturing
test flow of processors. With delay defects becoming more common due to the
properties of the newer process technologies, at-speed functional tests have
become indispensable.
Traditionally, functional tests needed expensive automatic testing equip-
ment due to the memory and speed requirements associated. This cost issue
was solved by native-mode testing which uses the intelligence of the proces-
sor to test itself. In the native-mode self-test (also known as software-based
self-test) paradigm, instruction sequences are loaded into the cache to test the
processor for defects. Generally, only random instructions are used in native-
mode tests. As with any random sequence based testing, there are faults that
are left undetected by random instructions. Manual effort is necessary to gen-
erate the tests that can detect those faults, requiring a detailed knowledge of
viii
the instruction set architecture and the micro-architecture of the processor.
We propose an automatic technique that alleviates the need for such manual
effort.
Our technique has a hierarchical approach. We use traditional auto-
matic test pattern generation (ATPG) algorithms for generating tests at the
local level (module or combinational blocks). These tests are mapped to in-
structions at the global level using a verification engine. We also have feedback
between these two levels for more efficient testing. We demonstrate the tech-
nique on a publicly available processor. We then enhance the technique to test
an entire system-on-a-chip (SOC). A typical SOC has an embedded proces-
sor. We use this embedded processor to test the other blocks in the SOC. In
general, most of these blocks are designed by the design reuse methodology.
Therefore, these blocks may be available only as black-boxes. Our technique
is well suited to test such blocks. We use existing test vectors for the core and
present a technique that generates instruction sequences that when executed
by the processor generates the given vectors at the boundaries of the blocks.
We designed an SOC using an ARM core and a publicly available encryption
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The process of transforming a design from an abstract implementation
to a physical circuit on silicon contains various stages. At each stage an ex-
amination is done to affirm whether the design is still the same as the one
in the previous stage. Design validation and manufacturing testing are two
such examination steps. Design validation checks whether the register transfer
level (RT-Level) design satisfies the properties and constraints specified by the
architecture/design document. Manufacturing tests, as the name suggests are
done after the production of silicon. They assume that the design is correct
and check whether any defects were introduced by the manufacturing process
on the silicon. In this research, we concentrate on the manufacturing tests.
Manufacturing tests involve loading an automated test equipment (ATE)
with test vectors, connecting the device under test (DUT) to the ATE, apply-
ing the tests to the DUT and collecting the responses from the DUT through
the ATE. This raises two questions.
1. How are the tests generated?
2. How can we know that the tests run on the DUT are sufficient to detect
all the likely defects introduced during the manufacturing process?
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The tests are generated using a logic representation of the circuit. Many
algorithms have been developed [28], [24], [41] for this purpose starting with the
D-algorithm [67]. Satisifiability solvers have also been used for test generation
[49]. Since the goal of the tests is to detect as many defects as possible,
test generation should be targeted towards likely defects. However, the defect
information is not generally available at the logic level. Therefore, many fault
models (like stuck-at, path delay) have been proposed that model the physical
defects at the logic level. Depending on the complexity of the fault model,
many faults may be introduced on the logic representation of the circuit. Each
fault will define a corresponding faulty circuit at the logic level. The test
generation programs will have to generate vectors that cause the good (fault-
free) and faulty circuits to behave differently from each other. To know when
the generated tests are enough, a metric called fault coverage was created.
The fault coverage of a test is the ratio of the number faults detected by it
to the total number of faults defined by the fault model on the circuit. The
effectiveness of the tests is measured by their fault coverage.
One of the main differences between vector generation for design vali-
dation and test generation for manufacturing tests is based on the visibility of
the internal signals. Design validation, as mentioned earlier, checks whether
the RT-Level representation of the circuit conforms to the architectural spec-
ifications. Therefore, design validation test generation methodologies work
with the RT-Level representation of the circuit. These tests are also applied
(simulated) at the RT-Level, hence, during design validation all the signals
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in the design are generally visible. For manufacturing testing, tests are gen-
erated using a logic representation of the circuit. However, they are applied
on the silicon where only the design inputs/outputs are visible. Therefore,
the test generation algorithms for manufacturing tests will have to guarantee
both controllability and observability. Controllability ensures the excitation of
the fault. For example, in case of a stuck-at zero (s-a-0) fault on a line, the
test will have to produce a ’1’ on the line. Observability ensures the propa-
gation of the faulty value to an observable point like a primary output. The
test generation process has become increasingly difficult with the increasing
complexity of designs. Moreover, the amount of testing needed to attain good
coverage has also increased considerably. This, in turn, increases the amount
of memory required on the ATE equipment. ATEs also have to be faster to
due to the increase in clock frequencies. ATEs that can handle such at-speed
tests cost millions. Design for test (DFT) [22] techniques like scan chains and
built-in self-test (BIST) [34] were introduced to overcome these issues.
1.1 Scan and BIST techniques
A divide and conquer approach was suggested in [22] to make testing
easier by introducing scan chains in the circuit. Scan chains involve modifying
the memory elements (flip-flops or latches) in the circuit so that they can
be directly loaded with values from an external environment. These memory
elements are serially connected together. The testing now has two phases
shifting, when the values are serially shifted into the memory elements, and
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launch, when the values are launched from the memory elements into the
circuit. The response of the circuit is captured by the scan elements. These
values are then serially scanned (shifted) out. The test generation algorithm
now handles only the combinational portion of the design. Hence, in general,
both controllability and observability are improved. The values are shifted in
and out at far lower speeds than the actual clock frequency. This allows the use
of a slower ATE. Various test compression techniques were also proposed [38]
that work in conjunction with the scan techniques to reduce test content and
the test application time. Hence, the memory requirement on ATEs is also
reduced, considerably lowering the cost.
The BIST [34] paradigm proposes introducing structures within the de-
sign for the purpose test application and response capture. BIST architectures
were proposed for both the logic and memory. STUMPS [4] is a commonly
used BIST architecture for logic. Memory BIST architectures are more pop-
ular and are generally based on march algorithms [30]. When logic BIST is
used, the response of the circuit is captured in a linear feedback shift register
(LFSR) or a multiple input shift register (MISR). These circuits capture the
response and generate signatures that can be compared against the golden
values.
1.2 Need for at-speed functional tests
With the advent of DFT techniques, the original methodology of testing
without modifying the design came to be known as functional testing. Even
4
though using DFT techniques reduced the burden on the test generation tools
and the ATEs, at-speed functional tests very never fully replaced. Even with
the usage of multiple fault models there are certain defects that remain un-
modeled and functional tests are good at detecting those unmodeled defects.
Defects that affect the performance of a chip can only be detected by at-speed
tests. Moreover, DFT techniques involve area overhead on the device. Any
modification to a memory element makes it larger and slower. Hence, scan
elements cannot be used on critical paths within the design. The vectors
generated by BIST circuits do not have high coverage and a lot of vectors are
needed, increasing the test time. Moreover, both scan and BIST vectors might
lead the device into illegal states. State-of-the art designs are optimized for
power and timing, but only for legal states. An illegal state might lead to high
power consumption. There might be a lot of toggling when the test vectors
are shifted in, this might also lead to an increased power consumption. A lot
of research has been done towards optimizing power consumption during the
DFT-based test mode [53], [91]. However, it is still an open issue. Moreover,
with decreasing process geometries newer kind of defects are becoming more
common [1]. Defects like resistive shorts and opens are not effectively tested
by scan or BIST techniques [25]. The device operation also varies from chip to
chip due to the parametric variations induced by the nanometer scale process
technologies [11]. These variations manifest themselves as delay variations in
the circuit. Both resistive defects and the process variations make delay de-
fects (defects that cause change in the delay of the circuit) more common. It
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has been shown that testing for delay defects using only scan/BIST based tests
might cause yield loss due to overtesting [47]. All these factors make at-speed
functional tests increasingly indispensable.
1.3 Native-mode self-tests
Traditional at-speed functional tests of processors involve running nor-
mal instruction sequences to test the processor. These instructions test the
functionality of the processor [77]. For these tests, the processor is attached to
an ATE which simulates the presence of the memory system and the other en-
vironments that a processor generally interacts with. The stimuli (functional
tests) is applied by the ATE, which also gathers the response. These stimuli, in
general, were made up of the architectural validation vectors and some legacy
tests. However, as mentioned earlier ATEs that are capable of handling these
tests at-speed are prohibitively costly. Native-mode self-test [72] provided a
way to overcome the cost issue.
Native-mode self-test takes advantage of the processor’s intelligence to
test itself and is also called software based self-test (SBST) because it replaces
most of the BIST hardware with software code. For example, an LFSR can
be implemented in software. We will use the terms native-mode self-test and
software-based self-test interchangeably through out this dissertation. The
software programs used to test the processor can be directly loaded into the
processor’s cache from the ATE and run from there, requiring minimal de-
sign modifications. The loading of the cache can done at a lower speed than
6
the processor’s clock frequency. Therefore, a lower speed ATE can be used,
reducing the cost of the ATE. The block diagram showing the flow of native-
mode self-tests is shown in Figure 1.1(b). However, the issue of selecting the
kind of instructions that have to be used in the native-mode tests is a difficult
problem. One way to handle it is to fill the cache with random instructions.
However, there will be a lot of faults that are not detected if only random
instructions are used. Manual effort has been required till now to detect those
faults. It requires extensive and in-depth knowledge of the design/architecture
to manually generate tests for those faults. Therefore, an automated technique
to generate native-mode tests targeting specific faults has become a necessity.
This is one of the primary focuses of the research presented in this dissertation.
1.4 Generation of instruction sequences targeting spe-
cific faults
We need an automated technique to avoid the intense manual effort
involved in generating instruction sequences targeting specific faults. We can-
not use traditional ATPG algorithms “as is” due to the way they operate. In
general, they start from a specific fault and go forward and backward trying
to propagate and justify it. Some of the ATPG tools have the ability to take
in constraints. However, they tend to generate a vector first and then check
whether the vector meets the constraints. It is very important that, in case of





















































































Figure 1.1: Illustration of functional testing techniques. a) Traditional method
requiring an at-speed ATE b) Native-mode testing methodology reducing the
speed requirement on the tester equipment
specified by the instruction set architecture (ISA). The constraints specified by
the ISA can be very restrictive. For example, an ISA with 8-bit opcodes might
specify only 100 valid opcodes making it likely that an 8-bit value generated
without the prior knowledge of the ISA will not be a legal opcode. Therefore,
using traditional ATPG algorithms generally gives very low coverage when try-
ing to meet the constraints set forth by the architecture. However, the ATPG
tools are very efficient in generating tests for gate-level faults. Therefore, we
propose a hierarchical approach that includes an ATPG tool at the lower level
to make use of its advantages, while using a different tool at the higher level.
The hierarchical approach as shown in Figure 1.2 uses traditional ATPG










Figure 1.2: Hierarchical operation of the proposed technique
level may be a module of the design or a combinational block. The global level
contains the entire processor core. The verification engine we use is a bounded
model checker. A bounded model checker takes in as inputs a property, a
design and a bound. It unrolls the design to the bound and checks whether
the property can be disproved within that bound. The advantage that this
verification engine provides is the fact that it can take in the constraints from
ISA and use it as part of its search process. Therefore, unlike an ATPG
algorithm that generates a vector and then checks whether it is within the
ISA, the verification engine will start with the constraints we specify (like the
ISA) and then search for the vector. Verification engines are generally meant
for design validation and are not suited to take in the fault information and
generate tests for those faults, making them ineffective at the local level. In
effect, by using different engines at different levels, we try to get the best of
9
both worlds.
In the following chapters we will go into more detail while explaining
the technique and the experiments that we did. We first apply our technique
to stuck-at faults. We use a commercial ATPG tool at the module level. We
then map the sequence generated by the ATPG tool to instructions using the
bounded model checker. The ATPG tool generates test sequence at the inputs
of the module and propagates the faulty value to a module output. The map-
ping technique, using the bounded model checker, both maps the test sequence
at the module inputs and propagates the faulty value from the module output
to an observable output. The bounded model checker is given the RT-Level
design to work with. For the propagation of faulty value, we initially propose
an iterative refinement technique. There is a manual component involved in
the iterative refinement. We do away with this manual component later by
introducing an entity called observation abstraction.
1.5 Targeting delay defects
After targeting stuck-at faults, we apply our technique to test for delay
faults. We use a similar hierarchical approach. However, in case of delay faults,
each fault actually represents a path. A long path might extend over more than
one module. Therefore, local level test generation cannot be stopped at the
module boundaries. Hence, we define the combinational portion of the design
as the local level during the test generation. Generating tests for a path and
then mapping them to instruction sequences is not very efficient. Therefore,
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we map the paths directly, making it necessary that the verification engine
work with the gate level design. Moreover, attempting to map all the paths
is not very advisable. Therefore, we have a local level test generator to act as
a filter. We use a PODEM-based test generation tool on a delay annotated
circuit to identify paths that have a test at a combinational level. The tool also
identifies those paths that are critical as specified by a fault model. We use
the global mapping technique to generate instructions to test those paths. A
common non-functional segment might cause many paths to be non-functional.
Many of the critical paths share common segments. Therefore, we develop a
feedback mechanism which weeds out the paths that contain a sub-path that
has been found to be non-functional. This helps us in reducing the amount of
effort spent on mapping paths.
In case of delay paths, the effect of the path has already been propa-
gated to a flop. It makes it more possible that any instruction sequence that
guarantees the excitation of the fault will also incidentally ensure propagation
of the fault to an observable output. Therefore, we propose a technique which
generates excitation only tests and checks for propagation through simulation.
We use a technique based on netlist modification which checks whether a test
propagates a given path to an observable point. The number of possible faults
in a circuit is higher than the number of stuck-at faults when a good delay
fault model is used. Therefore, the number of tests required to achieve good
coverage in the case of delay faults may be significantly higher. Hence, we
enhance the simulation technique to identify all the critical paths that are
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detected by each test. This helps us in reducing the test data.
1.6 Testing a system-on-a-chip
As the ITRS document of 2005 notes [1], there is an increasing trend to-
wards integration of designs making systems-on-a-chip (SOCs) more common.
Therefore, testing of SOCs has become a pressing issue. In general, techniques
like boundary scan [87] are used while testing SOCs. These techniques have
similar drawbacks as the DFT techniques mentioned earlier. Therefore, it
is imperative that these tests be complemented with functional tests. Most
SOCs contain an embedded processor. We develop a solution that uses this
embedded processor to test other cores in the SOC.
In SOC designs, the concept of design reuse is very prominent. Design
reuse involves using blocks of design that already exist instead of designing
a whole new chip. Blocks of logic called intellectual property (IP) cores are
provided by many vendors that are used by the designers while developing an
SOC. These cores are of three kinds.
1. White-box – Internal implementation of the core is visible. Changes can
also be made to the core.
2. Grey-box – Internal implementation of the core is visible. Changes can-
not be made to the core.
3. Black-box – Internal implementation of the core is not visible. Changes
cannot be made to the core.
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Many of the IP cores are available as black-box only, which means that the
SOC designer will not know the internal implementation of the SOC. Any
SOC testing technique that caters to black-box cores should work without the
knowledge of the logical implementation of the cores. Vendors providing IP
cores may also provide test stimuli that can be used to verify/test the core.
We make use of these vectors. We map those stimuli into instructions. These
instructions when loaded into the embedded processor, will produce the stimuli
at the inputs of the core. The advantage of this method is that it can be used
to test grey-box and white-box IP cores too. In those cases, we can also have a
hierarchical method, where we generate test vectors for the IP cores by using
their logical implementation and then map them using our technique.
1.7 Outline
In the following chapters we explain our techniques in detail. Before
going into detail about our technique we survey the relevant work in the test-
ing paradigms that are related to the research presented here. The testing
paradigms that are relevant to our work include hierarchical testing, functional
testing for delay and stuck-at faults, SOC testing and RT-Level testing. We
provide a sample of the work available in literature in these fields in Chapter 2.
We explain the automation of the controllability part of the mapping
technique in Chapter 3. The controllability part of the mapping technique
pertains to the excitation of the fault with an instruction sequence. We also
elaborate on the iterative refinement technique for propagation in this chapter.
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We use the stuck-at fault model as our target fault model and use the opencores
RISC (OR1200) processor as our design for experimentation in this chapter.
In Chapter 4, we present our technique of using observation abstractions for
automated propagation of faulty values. We again use stuck-at fault model
and the OR1200 processor. We chose OR1200 because it is publicly available
from opencores website [89] and is a fairly complex design.
We will explain our technique for testing for delay defects in Chapter 5.
In this chapter, we will use a gate level model of the OR1200 processor synthe-
sized using standard cells which have been characterized for delay. The fault
model that we use for delay defects is a superset of the stuck-at fault model.
Therefore, the coverage results presented in this chapter are valid for stuck-at
faults also. We then move on to generating efficient tests, i.e., we generate
instruction sequences that have better probability of detecting multiple delay
faults. Our technique for doing so is presented in Chapter 6.
We design and develop a SOC using an ARM processor and an ad-
vanced encryption standard (AES) core. We apply our technique for SOC test
generation on this model. We show the results of this and explain the SOC
testing technique in detail, in Chapter 7. We provide illustrative examples
while explaining all of these techniques. We present the conclusions that we
drew from the research in Chapter 8. We also discuss strengths and draw-
backs of our techniques in that chapter. We also lay some groundwork for
future research in related areas in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Testing: Various approaches and issues
2.1 Functional tests
Many approaches have been presented to tackle the problem of func-
tional testing. Earlier methods did not target structural gate level faults. The
fault models used were functional. In the seminal work in this kind of testing,
Thatte et al. [77] proposed having a graphical representation of the func-
tional description of the processor and generating tests (instructions) based
on this graph. A functional fault model depicts various functionalities of the
processor like register decoding and instruction execution. This methodology
was enhanced later to include complex instruction execution and cache ac-
cess in [12] and [29]. A control fault model was proposed at the instruction
level in [73]. This method considers the read/write instructions which setup
the test separately and has a checking experiment for those instructions. The
main drawback of using a functional fault model is based on the fact that it
might not have a good correlation with the actual defects caused by the fab-
rication process and test generated with good coverage of such a model might
still miss some defective chips.
A new methodology for functional testing was proposed by Shen et
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al. in [72]. They proposed loading random instruction sequences into the
cache and testing the processor using those instructions. This methodology
was applied in an industrial setting in FRITS [65]. FRITS detected many
defective chips that passed traditional tests. This result has propelled the
recent research in this area. Many techniques were proposed with the gate level
fault model as the goal, mostly targeting the stuck-at fault model. Kranitis
et al. [42] presented a method to generate deterministic programs for self-
testing of arithmetic modules. This method, however, requires knowledge of
the functionality of each block within the RT-Level implementation. Corno
et al. [19] used evolutionary techniques to direct the search process. Chen et
al. [17] dealt with mapping of module level sequences to instructions. Their
technique extracts module signals and maps them to instruction templates
using pre-defined mapping functions. However, their technique depends on
the quality of the instruction templates and the mapping functions. All these
techniques target stuck-at faults, however, they do not, in general, have the
capability of guaranteeing tests for specific faults.
2.2 Hierarchical testing
The techniques that we propose for testing processors and SOCs have
two levels and are hierarchical. A hierarchical approach has been popular for
sequential test generation because it makes it possible to target complex de-
signs due to the divide and conquer nature of such an approach. Moreover,
most of the state of the art chips are designed by multiple designers. Therefore,
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the designs are split into multiple blocks with various blocks communicating
with each other. The modularity of such designs makes a hierarchical ap-
proach highly attractive. The test generation for processors also lends itself
for a hierarchical approach because it has to work under two different kind of
constraints. At the global level it has to deal with the constraints imposed by
the ISA and the external environment, and at the local level it has to satisfy
the constraints caused by the structure of the circuit and the faults targeted.
Roy et al. [68] proposed using the data flow descriptions to generate
tests for sequential VLSI circuits hierarchically. They use a recursive approach
for propagation and justification. An automatic knowledge extraction tool
(ATKET) was presented in [84]. This tool extracts the information from var-
ious modules into suitable data structures and generates tests using a custom
ATPG tool. The ATPG tool will always maintain information about various
modules in the design. Murray and Hayes [61] presented a two level approach
where they generate module level test sequences and then generate tests for
them at the full chip level. They term these module level test sequences as
pre-computed sequences and use them as primitives. A hierarchical approach
to test processors was proposed by Tupuri et al. in [79]. Their approach ex-
tracts the constraints imposed by the circuit on a module of the design and
proposes implementing those constraints as virtual constraint circuits around
the module. It proceeds to use an ATPG engine to generate tests for faults in
the module using the module and its corresponding virtual constraint circuit.
This technique was extended to SOCs in [81]. A program slicing based ap-
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proach was suggested by Vedula et al. [82]. Their approach uses slicing at the
RT-Level to remove all the statements which are not related to the module
under test. This reduced code is then supposed to be synthesized and given
to an ATPG tool.
2.3 RT-Level test generation
The technique that we propose for stuck-at faults specifies the proper-
ties for the verification engine at the RT-Level. We can therefore use an engine
that works at the RT-Level. Generating tests at the RT-Level has many ad-
vantages. The code at the RT-Level is more intuitive and simple. Since the
complexity of the design is lower at the RT-Level, test generation might be
easier. In most hierarchical approaches the global level test generation does
not need the circuit level information. Therefore, the global test generation
can be generally done at the RT-Level. If a gate level fault model is not used,
RT-Level test generation can be used even without a hierarchical approach.
However, those fault models would have to be correlated with the gate level
fault models.
An example of using RT-Level test generation in a hierarchical approach
is [61]. In that approach, Murray et al. generate tests for pre-computed test
sequences at RT-Level. However, their technique requires the design to be
acyclic. Bhatia et al. [7] proposed a RT-Level test generation solution that
requires the control and datapath to be separate. Lingappan et al. [52] rep-
resent the RT-Level design as algebraic decision diagrams (ADD) [2] and use
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abstractions to represent the components of the ADD. Fallah et al. [23] pro-
posed a method which generates tests for observability enhanced code cover-
age of hardware description language (HDL) descriptions. They use a hybrid
method which employs both linear programming and Boolean satisfiability
solvers. Xin et al. [88] generate tests for behavioral VHDL descriptions. Their
method works for a highly restrictive form of VHDL code.
2.4 Targeting delay faults
With the decreasing geometries of the process technologies, delay de-
fects are becoming more common [25], [11]. Thus, testing for delay defects
is a must in future chips. In general, at-speed functional tests are known to
be very effective in detecting delay defects [25]. Moreover, using techniques
like enhanced scan [21] to test for delay defects might lead to yield loss due
to overtesting [66]. It has been shown that a large portion of the paths in the
design (≈ 80%) are functionally untestable [47]. All these factors have caused
an increased interest in generating functional tests for detecting delay defects.
Lai et al. proposed a technique in [48] to target path delay faults. How-
ever, their methodology targets only non-pipelined processors. Singh et al. [74]
target path delay faults in pipelined processors. However, their technique in-
volves manually constructing a graph model for the processor. Moreover, they
do not tackle the problem of propagating the effects of faults from internal
flops (non-register file flops) to observable outputs. Lin et al. proposed a
technique for path delay fault testing of processors in [51]. They developed a
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methodology called pseudo-functional BIST. This technique does not gener-
ate functional sequences, instead it uses scan based testing and increases the
probability of scan vectors to be functionally feasible.
We will deal with delay fault simulation in order to reduce the test
content. In general, commercial ATPG tools do not provide fault simulation
of path based delay faults for sequential circuits. [16], [18], [62] all provide fast
memory efficient ways for path delay fault simulation. However, they are ori-
ented towards scan based tests. A methodology based on netlist modification
was explained in [6]. This technique involved sabotaging the netlist so that if
path under test is excited, a faulty value is latched into the memory element
at the end of the path. This technique can be used for fault simulation when
functional tests are involved.
2.5 Testing SOCs
SOCs are becoming more common making testing them an important
issue to be addressed. In general, SOCs contain an embedded processor core.
Most of the functional test approaches surveyed in Section 2.1 can be used for
testing the embedded processor core. Many approaches have been proposed
for testing the other cores. SOCs are generally designed using the design
reuse paradigm. The non-processor cores in the SOC are mostly bought from
intellectual property (IP) vendors. Many of these cores (known as IP cores)
are available only as black-boxes. In general, test sequences already exist for
these cores either from the vendor providing the core or from a previous use
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of the core. Therefore, most of the research on testing the IP cores is focused
on providing test access mechanisms (TAMs) to deliver the test sequences.
The TAMs can be based on direct access where the cores can be accessed
through pins of the SOC. Direct access can be boundary scan based [78], [87].
These kinds of TAMs provide a serial access. Therefore, the test application
time will be high due to the time taken for serial scan shifting. This can be
reduced by providing a parallel access to the IP cores [37]. However, such a
scheme would entail allocation of many SOC pins for test access and also area
overhead for the routing of access mechanisms.
Test access can also be done through the embedded processor cores.
The access from the embedded core can be non-functional, i.e., this kind of
access will not occur during the normal operation of the SOC. Papachristou
et al. [64] proposed direct access to the cores from the processor and also the
responses to be collected in a signature verifier. Krstic et al. [45] proposed
having test wrappers around the IP cores and accessing the wrappers through
the processor. Hwang et al. [36] provided a similar technique based on reuse
of the addressable system bus. The test access through the processor can be
functional, i.e., the processor will access the cores through mechanisms that it
uses during the normal SOC operation. The advantage of this kind of access is
that there is very little area/power overheads involved. Jayaraman et al. [40]
proposed a way to test USART with such an access. Tehranipour et al. [76]
used functional access to test the peripheral cores. Their approach needs
information on processor and peripherals so that instructions can be sorted
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and grouped according to their likelihood of accessing various parts internal
to cores. A methodology using the high level coverage metric was proposed to
test the peripherals in [9], [10].
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Chapter 3
A two level approach for generating functional
tests
When random instruction sequences are used in functional tests, there
is a class of faults, termed as hard-to-detect faults, that is not detected. In
order to target such hard-to-detect faults, it is beneficial to have knowledge
about the instructions that can excite those faults. Although generic sequential
ATPG tools ( [5],[63],[70]) are highly optimized, they are not effective for large
designs like processors. These ATPG tools can, however, be used effectively to
generate test sequences for faults at the module level. These module level test
sequences can then be mapped to primary inputs/outputs of the processor.
The input space of the processor is decided by its instruction set. Therefore,
the module level test sequences can be mapped to instruction sequences.
In this chapter, we present a novel hierarchical approach to generate
instruction sequences targeting specific faults in a processor. We use an ATPG
tool to generate tests at the module level and then map the module level
test sequences globally to instructions using a verification engine. Our global
mapping works at the RT-Level. The verification engine we use is based on
bounded model checking [8]. Our technique is generic and can be applied to
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any off-the-shelf processor. It is intended for use by the designer and requires
minimal expertise.
Bounded model checking is used for both controllability and observ-
ability analysis of module level test sequences. Controllability of a given test
sequence is dealt with in the following way. We generate a Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) [54] safety property for controllability from a given module level
test sequence. Cadence SMV’s bounded model checker (SMV-BMC) [46] is
then used to verify the generated property. We also constrain the SMV-BMC
input space by providing it the instruction set of the processor. The property
is written such that if the module level test sequence can be generated through
the instruction set, then SMV-BMC provides a counterexample for the prop-
erty. We term the test sequences that can be generated through the instruction
set as functionally feasible. The counterexample generated by SMV-BMC will
contain a possible instruction sequence that can produce the given module
level test sequence. Observability of the module level test module level test
sequences is handled in a similar manner, by applying SMV-BMC iteratively.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows.
1. We introduce a technique for mapping module level test sequences to
instructions, using bounded model checking.
2. We provide an iterative method to check the observability.
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3.1 Background
3.1.1 Bounded model checkers
When a model and a property are given to a model checker, it will give
a yes/no answer that tells us if the property holds on the given model or not.
If the property does not hold, an error trace, or a counterexample is produced.
Bounded model checkers prove the correctness of properties of a model within
a given bound. We use SMV-BMC, which accepts properties written in LTL.
3.2 Instruction mapping of module level test sequences
We apply bounded model checking to instruction mapping of module
level test sequences for every module of the processor’s design. For every
module of the processor, we translate a module level test sequence into an
LTL property. The property ties the signals to the corresponding values in
the module level test sequence. We negate this property and pass the resulting
safety property through SMV-BMC. If a counterexample is produced, it implies
that the signal values given in the module level test sequence can be generated
by an instruction sequence of the processor.
The connection between the module inputs and the processor inputs
(instruction sequence) is made due to the hierarchical operation of SMV-BMC.
Figure 3.1 shows this operation pictorially. In Figure 3.1, the solid arrows show
the input/output dependencies between modules and the dashed arrows give
the hierarchical flow of a counterexample. M3 is the module under test (MUT).
The module level test sequence at the inputs of M3 is converted into a LTL
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Figure 3.1: A hierarchical structure given to SMV-BMC. The dashed arrows
give hierarchical flow of counterexample and the solid arrows show the in-
put/output dependencies between modules.
property and passed through SMV-BMC. The counterexample, if generated
by SMV-BMC, contains the values of outputs (‘o’ in the figure) of M1 and
M2. The counterexample also provides values of all the intermediate signals
of M1 and M2 (as shown by dotted arrows) and the inputs (‘i’ in figure) of
M1 and M2. Therefore, the counterexample provides signal values until the
instruction ‘I’, which is the input of the main module M0. We constrain the
input space of SMV-BMC by providing it the instruction set of the processor
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under test. SMV-BMC is also used for extracting observability constraints and
checking the functional feasibility of module level test sequences. A bound is
computed and given to SMV-BMC. The computation of the bound is natural
in the case of in-order pipelined processors with the external stalls disabled. In
such a processor an instruction which enters the pipeline exits after N cycles,
where N is the pipeline depth of the processor. Therefore, the effect of the
instruction is felt for N + 1 cycles if there is pipeline forwarding and for N
cycles if there is no forwarding. Hence, the bound should be more than the
pipeline depth of the processor. If there are multicycle instructions, then the
number of extra cycles taken by the longest instruction should also be added
to get a good bound.
Figure 3.2 gives the flowchart for the technique. The shaded boxes in
the flowchart are implemented using SMV-BMC. We start with a module level
test sequence and first analyze its controllability. In general, controllability
deals with the possibility of generating a desired value for an internal signal.
We check if the given module level test sequence can be generated through
the instructions in the instruction set of the processor. We need to define
controllability property C for this purpose.
The controllability property C is defined such that, if it fails, the coun-
terexample generated by SMV-BMC will contain the desired instruction se-
quence at the inputs of the processor.
For example, the test sequence given in Table 3.1 is first translated to
the LTL property:
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Translate to LTL property C
Verify the LTL property
Y
N



























Module level test sequence
test sequence
Module level
Figure 3.2: Flowchart for the instruction mapping of module level test se-
quences. The shaded boxes are implemented using SMV-BMC
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Table 3.1: An example test sequence
time a b c
0 1 0 x
1 1 1 x
2 x x 1
always
if ((a == 1) && (b == 0)) begin
wait(1);
if ((a == 1) && (b == 1)) begin
wait(1);






This property is then negated and built into an assertion. This assertion
is the desired controllability property C. For the example test sequence, C is:
always
if ((a == 1) && (b == 0)) begin
wait(1);
if ((a == 1) && (b == 1) begin
wait(1);





The property states that a, b and c can never have the values given in
the test sequence. The values in times 0, 1 and 2 are modeled using the next
state operator in LTL, which is represented by the wait statement in Verilog.
We pass the controllability property C to SMV-BMC along with the
processor’s RT-Level source code. SMV-BMC is also given the instruction set
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of the processor under test. The bound for SMV-BMC is calculated using the
method described earlier.
SMV-BMC checks for the existence of a counterexample for the stated
property within the given bound. If no such counterexample exists, then the
module level test sequence is functionally infeasible (within the given bound),
since it is not controllable. The technique proceeds only if there is a coun-
terexample.
The module level test sequence also identifies the module outputs that
need to be propagated to observable points to make it observable. Therefore,
in the observability stage of the technique, we extract constraints needed to
propagate these module outputs to an observable point of the processor. The
observable points of a processor include primary outputs, memory, register file
and all other user accessible points of the processor.
Since we use SMV-BMC for observability, we define an LTL property for
observability. The observability property O is defined such that if it fails, the
counterexample generated by SMV-BMC will contain the constraints necessary
for propagation of the module outputs. Therefore, observability property O
states that a change in a module output signal should not cause a change in









if (mo ^ temp_mo)
assert O: !(Po1 ^ temp_Po1)
& ...
& !(PoN ^ temp_PoN);
end
where mo is the module output that needs to be propagated and Po1,Po2,...PoN
are the observable points.
The property states that a change in the value of mo in the next state
does not imply that eventually one of the observable points will change their
value. A change is modeled by using an xor operator between the signal value
in the current state and the next state.
Property O is passed to SMV-BMC. If no counterexample is generated,
then the test sequence is functionally infeasible since it is not observable.
However, existence of a counterexample does not necessarily prove that module
output is observable. For example, consider the Verilog model given below:
always @(a or b or c or d or e)
begin
...
if (d == 1)
c = a;
else c = b;
f = c | e;
end
Let a be the module output which needs to be propagated and f be the






if (a ^ temp_a)
assert O: !(f ^ temp_f);
end
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It is possible then that SMV-BMC generates the counterexample:
state 1: state 2:
a = 0 a = 1
b = 1 b = 0
d = 0 d = 0
c = 1 c = 0
f = 1 e = 0
f = 0
The counterexample shows a change in the value of a and a change in
the value of f, which disproves the property O. However, a has not actually
been propagated. We term such a counterexample as spurious. A counterex-
ample is spurious if it disproves the observability property, although it does
not guarantee propagation of a module level test sequence. Therefore, the
property O has to be refined, to generate the correct counterexample, and
thereby, the correct constraints. For the given example, O is refined by adding








if ((a ^ temp_a) & d & temp_d)
assert O: !(f ^ temp_f);
end
The counterexample generated for this property gives all the necessary
constraints for observability. In general, the property O is iteratively refined
by adding constraints based on spurious counterexamples, until a counterex-
ample that actually models the propagation is found. The bound can also
be iteratively changed after starting with pipeline depth as the initial bound.
Note that the instruction set is not given as a constraint to SMV-BMC while
checking for observability. There is no need to constrain the inputs to the
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instruction set, Adding instruction set information to the property places the
unnecessary constraint of finding an instruction sequence which will cause a
change in the module output. This change in module outputs is caused only
when there is a fault, and does not depend on instructions.
The extracted observability property O, is combined with the control-
lability property C using simple conjunctions, and passed to SMV-BMC. At
this stage, SMV-BMC is also given the instruction set as a constraint. If SMV-
BMC produces a counterexample then the instruction sequence is extracted
from the counterexample. This is the required instruction sequence generated
by our technique.
It is possible that SMV-BMC does not find a counterexample. This
might be because of one of two possibilities. The first possibility is that the
controllability and observability properties contradict each other, i.e., the sig-
nal values obtained in the counterexamples for C and O have conflicting values.
In that case, SMV-BMC eliminates the module level test sequence. The sec-
ond possibility is that the observability constraints do not coincide with the
possible instruction sequences. This is possible, because we extract observabil-
ity constraints from SMV-BMC without providing it the instruction set as a
constraint. If no counterexample is generated, the module level test sequence
is declared as functionally infeasible.
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3.3 Mapping module level test sequences to instruc-
tions for OR1200
3.3.1 OR1200
The OR1200 is a publicly available processor design. The source code
in Verilog RTL of OR1200 is available from [89]. The specification manual can
also be found at [89].
The OR1200 is a 32-bit scalar RISC processor, with a Harvard micro-
architecture, 5 stage integer pipeline, virtual memory support (MMU) and
basic digital signal processing (DSP) capabilities. The central processing unit
(CPU) of the OR1200 has an instruction unit that implements the basic in-
struction pipeline. There are 32 general purpose registers (GPRs) of 32-bits
each in OR1200. The load store unit handles all the transfer between GPRs
and the internal bus of CPU. There is also an exception handling unit which
implements a uniform procedure for all exceptions. The integer execution unit
of OR1200 executes most integer instructions in one cycle. The basic block
diagram for OR1200 is given in Figure 3.3.
3.3.2 Generating module level test sequences for OR1200
We have to generate module level test sequences for OR1200. In order
to select faults in a module to target for the process, we wrote a random
instruction sequence which has 36750 instructions. The OR1200 was fault
simulated with this instruction sequence, and the fault coverage saturated
















Figure 3.3: OR1200 CPU’s block diagram
lists depending on the module to which they belong. A commercially available
ATPG tool was used to generate module level test sequences for each of these
faults. These module level test sequences were then fault simulated to add
information about module outputs that would change their values, in case of
a fault.
3.3.3 Generating LTL properties from module level test sequences
OR1200 has various external inputs that can cause a stall in the pipeline.
This helps the processor communicate correctly with the environment. How-
ever, we need to ensure that the counterexamples generated by SMV-BMC do
not stall the processor due to these external inputs. Similarly, we also need
to ensure that the counterexamples do not reset the processor. We state the
above constraints as part of our controllability property. The instruction set
information is added to the property, to constrain its input space.
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Setting those constraints for the properties is an one time operation.
These constraints remain the same for all module level test sequences. Each
module level test sequence is translated to its corresponding LTL property,
and the constraints are added to it. For example, for the test sequence (for
the module operandmuxes) given in Table 3.2, the controllability property is
given in Figure 3.4.
Table 3.2: A module level test sequence for OR1200
time id freeze ex freeze sel b[1] sel b[0]
0 0 0 X X
1 X 0 1 0
We have defined IF INSN LEGAL such that it is set if the instruction
fetched in the current cycle is legal (part of the instruction set of the OR1200).
As shown in the property PR, illegal insn is set if an illegal instruction (not
part of the instruction set) is fetched.
The remaining variables in the above property are the inputs of a mod-
ule. The assertion PR fails if the module level test sequence is generated at the
inputs of the module with legal instructions. Note that the ISA and the envi-
ronmental constraints remain the same. The part of the property pertaining
to module inputs is different in every case.
3.3.4 Observability
The initial observability property for any module level test sequence is




// rst and stall deactivation
icpu_err_i = 0; //for deactivating fetch stalls
du_stall = 0; //for du_stall
dcpu_rty_i = 0; //for lsu_stall
rst = 0;
. . .
// Test sequence and instruction set
if (!(‘IF_INSN_LEGAL))
illegal_insn = 1’b1;
if ( (‘IF_INSN_LEGAL) &&
(or1200_operandmuxes.id_freeze == 0)
&& (or1200_operandmuxes.ex_freeze == 0))
begin
wait(1);
if ( (‘IF_INSN_LEGAL) &&
(or1200_operandmuxes.ex_freeze == 0)




assert PR: (illegal_insn == 1’b1);
end
end




if (or1200_alu.flagforw == 1’b0)
begin
wait(1);
if (or1200_alu.flagforw == 1’b1)
begin
wait(1); //wait till previous flagforw
//bit reaches register file
temp = rf_dataw;
wait(1); //wait till later flagforw bit
//reaches register file





Figure 3.5: Property for observability
the initial observability property does not ensure propagation of outputs to
observable points. For example, for one of the module level test sequences, the
flagforw output of the or1200 alu needs to be propagated to an observable
point.
The initial property is shown in Figure 3.5.
rf dataw contains the data written to register file and is an observable
point, since we make the register file observable. However, this property is
not enough to obtain the observability constraints. Consider the Verilog code
given in Figure 3.6. muxin c is the signal vector tied to flagforw. muxout is
directly tied to observable outputs.
The initial counterexample has the most significant bits of rfwb op set
to 00. In this case flagforw is blocked from propagating further. Therefore,
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always @(muxin_a or muxin_b or muxin_c or
muxin_d or rfwb_op)
case(rfwb_op[2:1])
2’b00: muxout = muxin_a;
2’b01: muxout = muxin_b;
2’b10: muxout = muxin_c;
2’b11: muxout = muxin_d + 4’h8;
endcase
Figure 3.6: Verilog code snapshot
the property has to be refined to add the constraint that the most significant
bits of rfwb op need to be tied to the value 10. A counterexample that is not
spurious is obtained after adding this constraint.
Therefore, the property for observability is iteratively refined to achieve
the desired results. However, once the constraints are extracted for propaga-
tion of all the outputs of a module, all the module level test sequences for that
module can be propagated using the same constraints.
3.3.5 Instruction generation
We have automated the generation of the controllability property as
well as checking its functional feasibility. All the module level test sequences
generated as described in Subsection 3.3.2 are checked for controllability. As
shown in Section 3.4 many of those module level test sequences are functionally
infeasible. Once a module level test sequence passes the controllability test,
an observability property is defined for it and signal values for output prop-
agation are extracted. The refined observability property is combined with
the controllability property to get the overall property of instruction mapping.
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The counterexample generated by SMV-BMC for this property contains an
instruction sequence that would generate the module level test sequence. If
no counterexample is found then the module level test sequence is declared as
infeasible.
3.4 Experimental results
As mentioned in Section 3.3, experiments were performed on OR1200
processor [89]. A long pseudo-random instruction sequence containing 36750
instructions was generated for the OR1200 CPU core. These 36750 instructions
were generated by randomly varying the data operands for the instructions
of OR1200. The OR1200 CPU core was fault graded for all possible stuck-
at faults for the random instruction sequence using a commercially available
tool [20]. The fault coverage saturated around 68%. The list of faults that
were left undetected formed the base list. We applied our technique on this
base list. We thereby simulated hard-to detect faults which are the principal
target of the technique.
We split the base list based on modules. We generated the module
level test sequences by the method described in Section: 3.3.2. We checked
functional feasibility for all the module level test sequences that were gener-
ated. Table 3.3 shows the results for the functional feasibility check of all the
module level test sequences.
The first column in Table 3.3 gives the name of each module. The
number of module level test sequences for each module (which is same as
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Table 3.3: Result for feasibility check on module level test sequences
Module No. of Uncontrollable











the number of faults in each module that were undetected by the random
instruction sequence) is given in the second column. The number of test
sequences that were functionally infeasible is given in third column.
Out of the module level test sequences designated as functionally fea-
sible, we picked some sequences at random and we generated an instruction
sequence for each of them. We kept track of observability constraints that
were extracted for each module level test sequence and re-used them if the
same module output had to be made observable for some other module level
test sequence.
SMV-BMC was allowed to start from any state allowing registers to
contain any value at the beginning of the instruction sequence generated by
SMV-BMC. Therefore, we added an initialization sequence which loaded those
values into registers. OR1200 has a load-store architecture. Therefore, it is
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Table 3.4: Instruction mapping for each module





easier to initialize the registers to desired values. Table 3.4 shows the results
of our instruction mapping for the example modules. The results have been
shown on control (ctrl) and datapath (alu, operandmuxes) modules.
The first column in Table 3.4 gives the name of the module. The
second column gives the number of module level test sequences for which
the instructions were generated. The total number of instructions that were
generated for the selected module level test sequences is shown in the third
column. We fault simulated the instruction sequences at chip level and checked
if they detected the fault corresponding to the module level test sequence.
We also found that the technique lends itself well to prioritizing instruc-
tions. If the user wants to assign higher priority to certain instructions, then
instruction set input to SMV-BMC can be constrained to those instructions.
This can be useful if the user wants to avoid instructions like load and store
which are multicycle operations.
Table 3.5 gives some examples of instruction sequences that were gener-
ated for some of the module level test test sequences from Table 3.4. The first
column gives the module name. The second column gives the location of the
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Table 3.5: Some example instruction sequences that were generated
Module Pin path Fault type Instruction Faults
Sequence detected
alu /U2723/C s-a-1 l.ori r31, r0, 0xffff 441
l.cust5
ctrl /U1091/A s-a-1 l.ori r31, r0, 0x4 2424
l.ori r30, r0, 0x2
l.nop
l.sw 0x0(r31), r31
l.addc r31, r30, r31
l.mfspr r22, r1, 0xf
operandmuxes /U680/C s-a-0 l.andi r1, r1, 0xf813 463
l.movhi r0, 0xf813
l.addi r0, r1, 0xf813
l.sw 0x13(r1), r31
l.movhi r0, 0xfcf3
fault within the corresponding module. The type of fault is indicated in the
third column. The instruction sequence generated by our mapping technique
is shown in the fourth column. These instructions belong to the OR1200’s
instruction set architecture. The fifth column gives the number of other faults
from the base list that were detected by this instruction sequence.
It can be observed from the table that the instruction sequence gen-
erated for a specific fault also detected many other faults from the base list.
The instruction sequence shown for ctrl module detected more than 2000 other
faults from the base list. This is because the instruction sequence contained
an instruction (l.mfspr) which operated on the special purpose register. This
instruction was difficult to generate in the random instruction sequence. How-
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ever, our technique generated an instruction sequence containing this instruc-
tion. We also found that l.cust5 targeted most of the faults in the alu mod-
ule. This was because l.cust5 instruction does not give complete access to its
operands making it is difficult to load it with appropriate values using random
instruction sequences.
3.5 Discussion
We have shown a new technique for instruction mapping of module
level test sequences. We have used bounded model checking in our technique.
In the technique’s flow, SMV-BMC can be replaced with a traditional model
checker and the technique would still be correct. Mishra et al. [59] provided
a way for targeting interesting cases in the pipeline for validation using a tra-
ditional model checker. However, they use an abstraction of the processor.
Therefore, it is not possible to target any random case since it might not exist
in the abstraction. The blowup associated with using traditional model check-
ers on large designs makes it inefficient to use them without abstracting the
design. Bounded model checking has been proposed as a viable alternative to
traditional model checking. It provides a partial notion of correctness within
the given bound. Although bounded model checking does not guarantee cor-
rectness outside the bound, a counterexample obtained during bounded model
checking, is definitely valid within that bound. Since our technique translates
the module level test sequences into safety properties, a counterexample im-
plies that the safety property does not hold within the specified bound. The
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notion of pipeline depth in processors provides a natural way to compute a
bound for SMV-BMC.
A major advantage of the technique is that we leverage an existing
formal verification engine for solving a problem, that has traditionally been
solved by ATPG engines. The existing formal verification engine ensures the
automatic and correct operation of the justification like algorithm. Since we
add the properties at the RT-Level, any bounded model checking tool can be
used for our method. We used SMV-BMC because it was an easily available
and robust tool. We can easily substitute it with an engine which works at
RT-Level or uses word-level reasoning.
The main overhead of the technique could be viewed as writing the
LTL properties. We have automated the generation of controllability proper-
ties. There is no manual intervention required to check the controllability of a
module level test sequence. In case the processor under test has mechanisms
like the observe only scan chains [14], we can use this controllability check
methodology as a standalone technique to generate tests. Manual interven-
tion is required when the observability property has to be refined. We remove




Using observation abstractions for propagation
In Chapter 3, we presented a technique for generating an instruction se-
quence that produced a given test sequence at a module’s inputs. Although the
controllability was fully automated in this technique, the propagation of mod-
ule outputs to processor outputs (observability) had a manual component. In
this chapter, we present an automatic technique to propagate module outputs
to processor outputs, thereby eliminating the need for manual intervention in
the test generation process.
We use Boolean difference for propagation in our technique. Boolean
difference has been previously used for test generation [49]. Boolean difference
of a function with respect to a signal is true if the function depends on the
signal. The constraints required for propagation of a module output can be
seen as the constraints required to make some primary output dependent on
the given module output. Therefore, we express the propagation requirement
as a Boolean difference problem. We model the Boolean difference problem
as a linear temporal logic (LTL) [54] formula and pass it to a bounded model
checker [8]. For our purposes, we will use Boolean difference to model the
following property:
There is no dependence between the module output and any of the primary
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outputs.
We will then pass this property to a bounded model checker. If this property
fails within the given bound then a counterexample is generated, showing that
there is a dependence. The constraints needed for propagation are given by
the counterexample itself. If the bounded model checker does not produce
a counterexample, we can assert that propagation is not possible within the
given bound.
Boolean difference, however cannot be expressed succinctly in LTL.
Due to the large number of variables in any reasonably sized circuit design,
the property (machine) blows up. Hence, an alternate strategy is required to
express Boolean difference succinctly in LTL, for our purposes. We circumvent
the property blowup problem by a introducing an abstraction at the RT-Level.
We call this abstraction as observation abstraction. Observation abstractions
hide unnecessary details of the design, and retain only the portion of the design
relevant to the target LTL property. This enables us to check observability
properties modeled as LTL formulas.
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Boolean difference
Boolean difference is an accepted method [49] of representing fault prop-
agation in a circuit. The Boolean difference of any function F with respect to
its variable xi is given by,
F (x1, · · · , xi−1, 1, xi+1, · · · , xn) ⊕ F (x1, · · · , xi−1, 0, xi+1, · · · , xn)
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The Boolean difference of F with respect to xi will be true iff F depends
on xi. Therefore, Boolean difference can be used to find the dependence of a
circuit’s output function on any of the circuit’s internal signals.
4.2 Automation of propagation
4.2.1 Observability using Boolean difference
A module output mo is propagated to a primary output Po iff the
Boolean difference of Po with respect to mo is true. Hence, the constraints
necessary for propagation would be the constraints that make this Boolean
difference true. If we negate this Boolean difference equation and pass it to
SMV-BMC as an LTL formula, along with the design under test, the coun-
terexample produced by SMV-BMC will contain the necessary constraints for
propagation.
Boolean difference cannot be expressed succinctly in LTL. When the
change in a function with respect to some input variable is expressed in LTL,
the resulting formula needs an explicit substitution of the variable in question.
If the number of input variables, (in our case, the signals of a circuit) are large,
the resulting LTL formula will be intractable. This will result in a space/time
blowup of the (bounded) model checker.
In order to overcome this problem, and express Boolean difference suc-
cinctly in LTL, we propose an RT-Level abstraction that abstracts, or hides the
details that are unnecessary to the LTL formula, thereby making it smaller and
more compact. We call this abstraction observation abstraction. We outline
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the algorithm to construct observation abstractions below.
4.2.2 Algorithm
Let M be a Verilog design with k modules m, such that M = ‖k
i=1m
where ‖ is the parallel composition operator. Let OP be the set of all output
signals of M . Let AS be the set of all the statements in M . Consider a module
mi. Let t be a single-bit output signal of mi, whose (test) value we want to
propagate to (at least one of) the outputs. We call this the signal under test.
All the signals that appear on the left hand side of an assignment
statement are said to be defined and the ones that appear on the right hand
side are said to be used. For a statement s, let U(s) denote all the signals that
are used in s and D(s) denote all the signals that are being defined in s.
Definition 1. Affectation
A set of statements S is said to be affected by the values of a signal x
at a given point if x defines a subset of signals used in S.
Definition 2. Observability
A signal x is said to be observable if a change in the value of the signal
causes a change in the value of at least one of the outputs.
Definition 3. Observation Abstraction
An observation abstraction w.r.t 〈t, v〉 where t is the signal under test
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and v is a variable, is the transitive closure of all statements that are affected
by t, when t is assigned a value v.
We denote this observation abstraction by At=v.
The observation abstraction is meant to provide a means to express
the Boolean difference observability property in LTL. The LTL property is
now written with the help of this artifact. An algorithm for our technique
is given in Figure 1. The observation abstraction is computed with respect
to the two values that t can assume, namely 0 and 1. The corresponding
observation abstractions, At=0 and At=1 are created such that any statement
that is executed when the value of t is 0 is retained in At=0 and any statement
that is executed when the value of t is 1 is retained in At=1. This process
is done iteratively over all the statements, until a fixpoint is reached. The
fixpoint in this case is set of all reachable output signals. This is denoted by
ReachedOutputs. When no new output signals are reached in the most recent
iteration, the fixpoint is assumed to have been reached.
Now, the two observation abstractions, At=0 and At=1 contain all and
only those statements that are affected by the values t = 0 and t = 1. We
now write the required LTL property using the observation abstractions. For
every observable (output) signal ob, ob0 and ob1 are the two “versions” of the
signal in the corresponding observation abstraction. If ob0 is equal to ob1, it
would mean that the signal ob does not change to reflect a change in the value
of signal t, and therefore cannot be used to observe t. This is expressed as an
LTL property Pi = G(ob
0 6= ob1). G is a temporal logic operator that denotes
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“over all times”, or simply “always”. All such properties Pi, written for all
output signals can then be ORed together to build property P . The property
P can now check if any of the output signals can be used to observe the signal
under test.
1. Compute the observation abstraction with respect to 〈t, 0〉. Let
it be At=0 = φ initially. Let ReachedOutputs = φ. Let
PrevReachedOutputs = φ.
2. Repeat
(a) PrevReachedOutputs = ReachedOutputs
(b) For every statement s













until ReachedOutputs = PrevReachedOutputs
3. Compute the observation abstraction with respect to 〈t, 1〉. Let it be
At=1. (This computation will be similar to the computation of At=0)
4. For every (observed) signal ob ∈ OP , let ob ∈ At=0 be called ob0 and
ob ∈ At=1 be called ob1. Write an LTL property Pi = G(ob
0 6= ob1). Let
P = P0 | P1 . . . | Pn where n is the total number of observed outputs.
P is the required LTL property.
Figure 4.1: Algorithm for our technique using observation abstractions for
writing LTL properties.
An example illustrating the working of the algorithm is shown in Fig-
ures 4.2 and 4.3.






   z <= t | w;
   if (t) 
      y <= u & v;
   else
      y <= u | v;
end
always @(clk)
    ob <= y & z;
module example(clk,t,w,x,y,z,op);
Figure 4.2: Sample Verilog model. Here t (output of some other module) is
the signal that has to be propagated to an output of the current module. ob
is the only output signal.
0
t=0A
    ob <= y & z;ob




    y <= u | v;
always @(clk)
(a) Observation abstraction
with respect to 〈t, 0〉. ob0 is
the version of ob in At=0.
always @(clk) begin
t=1A
    ob <= y & z;ob1
   z <= 1;





tion with respect to 〈t, 1〉.
ob1 is the version of ob in
At=1.
Figure 4.3: An example illustrating the algorithm. The property P for this
example is G(ob1 6= ob0). This reduces to G(((u | v) & w) 6= ( u & v)).
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by a proof by contradiction. For the LTL property to fail portraying the
signal propagation on observation abstractions At=0 and At=1, there must be
at least one statement that can be reached in the original Verilog program,
that cannot be reached in At=0
⋃
At=1. However, by definition, At=0 contains
all the statements reachable when t = 0 and At=1 contains all the statements
reachable when t = 1. Since these are the only two values allowed for a single
bit Boolean variable t, it can be shown that the desired LTL property for
propagation can be expressed using observation abstractions for a signal. A
similar argument can be presented for the reverse direction establishing the
completeness of the observation abstractions.
The algorithm for computing observation abstractions is linear in the
size of the program. Therefore, the scalability of the technique is not chal-
lenged by the size of the program or the number of observed variables. How-
ever, the capacity of the lower level engine (in this case a bounded model
checking engine) is limited, and depending on the number and size of the vari-
ables, there might be a blowup, despite the reduction in size afforded by these
abstractions.
4.2.3 Constraints extraction
Once P is defined, we obtain the observability property O by negating
P . We pass O to SMV-BMC along with the model At=0
⋃
At=1.
The negation of the property P , or O, implies that there exists no signal
in OP , that can be used to observe the signal under test t. If the property
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does not hold true, SMV-BMC will provide a counterexample, indicating that
there exists at least one output signal, that can be used to observe t. The
counterexample to the property O is a witness to the property P . Hence, the
counterexample will contain the constraints necessary to propagate the signal
under test, t.
4.2.4 Functional test generation
The controllability part for functional test generation is similar to the
one we described in Chapter 3. The final property is of the form (C =⇒ O),
where C is the controllability property and O is the observability property
derived in previous sections. We transform the given test sequence at the
module inputs to an LTL property to obtain the controllability property. We
pass the final property to SMV-BMC. We also add constraints so that external
stalls are disabled. We constrain the input space searched by SMV-BMC
to the processor’s ISA so that counterexample produced by SMV-BMC is
possible through valid instructions. We add the design in the backward cone
of influence of the module inputs and the observation abstractions to get the
model to pass to SMV-BMC. If SMV-BMC produces a counterexample on this
model under the constraints that we have derived then the counterexample
will contain the instruction sequence necessary to produce the module test
sequence at the module inputs as well as propagate the module output to
primary outputs. SMV-BMC has to be given a bound for it to work. We
provide a bound which is the maximum number of cycles an instruction can
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be present in the pipeline. If SMV-BMC does not produce a counterexample,
then we term the sequence to be unmappable. Those sequences are rejected.
Our results of rejected test sequences is valid within the bound.
4.3 Experimental results
Our tool to generate observation abstractions was written in C++ over
a C-based Verilog parser. We then performed our experiments on the OR1200
processor [89]. Since the primary target of our technique are again the hard-to-
detect faults, we used the same instruction sequence generated for experiments
in Chapter 3 and fault-graded the OR1200 CPU core for all possible stuck-at
faults using a commercially available tool [20]. The fault coverage saturated
around 68%. As in Chapter 3, the list of faults that were left undetected
formed the base list. We applied our technique on this base list. This base list
represents the hard-to-detect faults of OR1200.
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the results that were obtained from
the experiments. We will now explain the various experiments that were per-
formed and the results that were obtained.
4.3.1 Fully automated functional test generation
We sorted the base list (obtained above) based on modules. We gen-
erated a module level test sequence, using a commercially available ATPG
tool [20], for each fault individually. We then used our technique for func-
tional test generation (explained in Section 4.2.4) to map these module level
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Table 4.1: An overview of the results obtained
Overview of results
No. of instructions in OR1200 ISA 92
No. of combinational library primitives 19621
in the synthesized design
No. of sequential library primitives 1628
in the synthesized design
Total no. of uncollapsed faults 82098
Fault coverage of the random instruction sequence 68%
No. of faults in base list 26423
No. of additional faults detected 11296
Overall fault coverage 82%
test sequences to instruction sequences. Table 4.2 shows the results that were
obtained for this experiment.
The first column in Table 4.2 gives the name of each module. Second
column gives the number of faults of each module present in the base list. The
number of faults for which a good sequence was generated by the commercial
ATPG tool is given in the third column. A sequence is good iff it provides
both:
• The required values needed at the module inputs for controllability
• The module output signal through which the fault can be propagated
further
We note from the results that for some of the modules (‘rf’, ‘freeze’ and ‘ex-
cept’), the ATPG tool did not produce a good sequence for a majority of the
faults.
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Table 4.2: Result for instruction mapping of module level test sequences
Module Module Total Mapped Rej. Timed Effi. Av. Av.
faults tests tests tests out E abs. mapping
(%) time(s) time(s)
ctrl 1981 1764 159 1434 171 90.3 1.0 24.4
if 1764 1420 64 1335 21 98.5 1.5 34.5
lsu 1332 1245 291 91 861 30.8 1.1 28.1
wbmux 894 857 637 97 123 85.6 1.5 47.3
alu 2315 2311 38 901 1372 40.6 1.3 9.1
except 4138 474 41 261 172 63.7 0.9 18.4
genpc 2612 2352 1089 1239 24 98.9 0.3 12.9
rf 5148 1801 5 1668 128 92.8 1.3 28.0
sprs 4910 4851 229 2482 2140 55.8 0.7 17.5
freeze 73 27 1 24 2 92.5 1.1 23.0
opmux 362 217 36 176 5 97.6 1.1 26.7
We used SMV-BMC tool for mapping the good sequences to instruction
sequences. We used a bound of 7 for these experiments. The fourth column
of Table 4.2 gives the number of sequences that were successfully mapped to
instructions. The fifth column gives the number of sequences that were rejected
since they were not mappable within this bound, i.e., no counterexample was
found within the bound of 7. SMV-BMC tool was liable to explode in state
space for some cases. Hence, we placed a time-out, of 90 seconds, to limit
the amount of effort that was spent on mapping a good sequence. The sixth
column shows the number of sequences for which the SMV-BMC tool timed-
out. If the experiment had been performed with out a time-out, some more
of the sequences could have produced a result. We calculate the mapping
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M – No. of mapped sequences,
R – No. of rejected sequences,
T – Total no. of sequences.
We note from the table that the efficiency is above 90% for most of the modules.
However, the overall mapping efficiency is 71%. This is because the efficiency
falls below 50% for ‘alu’ and ‘lsu’ modules. As shown in the experiments of
Section 4.3.3, the time-outs which contribute towards the lowering of efficiency
happen due the observability phase of the technique. The average time taken
for producing the abstraction and for the mapping process is shown in the
last two columns. The average time taken for the abstraction process is for
all the good sequences. As can be seen from the table the abstractions were
generally generated in one second. The average time taken for mapping process
was calculated only for those sequences for which the SMV-BMC produced a
result, (i.e., SMV-BMC did not time-out).
4.3.2 Controllability check
We did an experiment to perform a controllability check that helps
interpret the results obtained in Table 4.2 better. We used the same good se-
quences from the experiment explained above and performed only the control-
lability check, i.e., we did not give the observability property to SMV-BMC.
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We used the same bound and time-out limits as the experiment in Section 4.3.1.
Table 4.3 shows the results that were obtained for this experiment. The total
number of sequences for each module is shown in the second column. The
third column shows the number of test sequences for each module that were
found to be controllable functionally. The fourth column shows the number
of test sequences that were found to be uncontrollable using instructions, i.e.,
no counterexample was found within the given bound. SMV-BMC produced
a result for all the good sequences, i.e., there were no time-outs.
Table 4.3: Result for controllability check
Module Total Controllable Rejected
test test test
sequences sequences sequences
ctrl 1764 1036 728
if 1420 1174 246
lsu 1245 1154 91
wbmux 857 825 32
alu 2311 1410 901
except 474 221 253
genpc 2352 1145 1207
rf 1801 1061 740
freeze 27 3 24
operandmuxes 217 170 47
sprs 4851 2438 2413
4.3.3 Observability check
Since there were no time-outs in the controllability check of Section 4.3.2,
the observability factor must be the one that increases the complexity of the
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state-space search and causes SMV-BMC to produce no result for some se-
quences in the experiments of Section 4.3.1. We performed an observability
check on good test sequences to provide an insight into those cases. For this
experiment we passed only the observability property to the SMV-BMC tool.
We used the same bound (of 7) and time-out (of 90 seconds) as the previous
experiments. The results obtained are shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Result for time-out experiment on observability phase
Module Total No. of Projected Time-out
no. of time-outs time-outs ratio
signals
ctrl 130 38 392 10.3
if 69 23 472 20.5
lsu 61 32 996 31.1
wbmux 65 33 196 5.9
alu 35 3 1493 497.7
except 87 45 268 5.9
genpc 34 1 56 56.0
rf 96 70 1293 18.5
freeze 4 2 7 3.5
opmux 85 21 21 1.0
sprs 163 63 2904 46.1
We started with the same good sequences. We made a list of mod-
ule output signals that the good sequences required to be propagated. As
mentioned in Section 4.3.1, each of these sequences specified a module output
signal through which the effect of the fault can be further propagated. Many
patterns identified same output signals for propagation. We performed the ex-
periment once for each module output signals that was identified. The number
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of different module output signals that were identified by good sequences for
each module is given in the second column of Table 4.4. The third column
gives the number of signals for which the experiment did not produce a result.
The fourth column gives the number of patterns that used a signal whose ob-
servability check timed-out to be propagated, this represents the number of
time-outs that can potentially occur while performing functional test genera-
tion of Section 4.3.1. We note that numbers in this column are higher than
the numbers in the time-out column of Table 4.2. This is due to either of the
following.
• While performing instruction mapping for a pattern, satisfaction of the
controllability property probably places a higher constraint on the state
space that needs to be searched. This presents a reduced state space to
search while proving (or disproving) the observability property.
• Some patterns whose propagation requirement timed-out in Table 4.4
were rejected (in the experiments of Section 4.3.1) because they were
either functionally uncontrollable or their propagation requirement con-
tradicted with the controllability requirement.
The final column of Table 4.4 gives the time-out ratio. Time-out ratio
is the ratio of numbers in fourth column to the numbers in the third column.
We can note from this column that modules (like ‘alu’, ‘sprs’ and ‘lsu’) whose
mapping efficiency were found to be low in Table 4.2, have a rather large time-
out ratio. This implies that module level test sequences for these modules
61
require the same output signal (whose observability check timed-out) to be
propagated a larger number of times than other modules. This leads to a
lowering of efficiency. A method for increasing the efficiency will be to force
the ATPG tool to identify some other output signal (which did not time-out)
for propagation while generating the tests at the module level. Since we did
not have enough control over the ATPG tool presently, we could not try this
successfully.
One result of the observability check not shown in the Table 4.4 is
that except for the ‘ctrl’ module, in every other module there were no module
output signals that failed the observability requirement. This is expected,
since in a processor signals that cannot be propagated under ISA constraints
mostly represent a redundant part of the design. In fact, the signals of the
‘ctrl’ which could not be propagated were found to be redundant.
4.3.4 Fault coverage
We derived test sequences at the OR1200 inputs from the counterex-
amples that were generated by SMV-BMC. For each module, we concatenated
these sequences and fault graded OR1200 for the concatenated sequence. The
results for this experiment are shown in Table 4.5.
The second column in the table shows the number of faults from the
base list, (i.e., the faults undetected by the random instruction sequence) that
were detected by the concatenated test sequence derived for each module.
There was an overlap in the additional faults detected by the test sequences
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of each module. Overall, 11296 faults from base list were detected. This
represented a 14% increase in fault coverage. Hence, the overall fault coverage
was 82%. It has to be noted here that this number is for the total fault
coverage. We did not eliminate the functionally untestable faults. Chen et al.
[17] observed that a 74% total fault coverage of a block (a combinational block
since that method requires block under test to be combinational) represents
a 90% coverage of functionally testable faults. Therefore, we speculate that
82% overall fault coverage represents a coverage of above 90% of functionally
testable faults. This result is also encouraging because [55] shows that a 80%
coverage with functional tests identifies more defective chips that structural
tests with far higher coverage. Moreover, the tests we generate can be applied
at-speed. The experiments done by McCluskey et al. show that at-speed tests
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catch more defective chips than same tests applied at a slower speed.
4.4 Discussion
We have a proposed a new technique that fully automates the process of
functional test generation targeting specific faults. We achieved it by proposing
a new technique for propagating module test outputs to primary outputs using
the ISA. This technique is based on an abstraction at RT-Level. We have
given the algorithm for abstraction. We have also shown the effectiveness of
our technique on an off-the-shelf processor.
A major contribution of this chapter is the observation abstraction.
This abstraction mechanism allows us to represent Boolean difference suc-
cinctly in LTL. The observation abstraction also allows us to express the
propagation requirement at the RT-Level. We can substitute SMV’s BMC
engine in our technique with any verification engine which takes in RT-Level
input. This allows us to use tools which use word-level reasoning in the future.
The mapping process of the technique is removed from the ATPG that
produces the sequence for testing a fault at module level. This is a drawback
since there might be more than one sequence that can detect a fault. Over-
coming this problem by using a feedback to the ATPG engine producing the




Generating instructions targeting delay defects
New kinds of defects are becoming more common with the emerging
manufacturing methodologies [25]. Some of these defects are resistive, i.e., the
nodes that have these defects are neither open nor shorted, but have a change
in their resistance. Other defects are symptoms of changes in the performance
caused by the variations in the process technology [11]. The common factor
with both these kinds of defects is that they manifest themselves as changes
in the delay of the circuit under test. Therefore, they are called delay defects.
Many delay defects may affect only the longer paths in the circuit because the
change in delay may be small. Therefore, they might escape detection from
traditional testing techniques.
We used the stuck-at fault model as our target in the previous chapters.
As the stuck-at fault model is not sufficient for delay defects, many delay
fault models ([75], [15], [43]) have been proposed. The common aspect in all
these models is that they test for a transition through a path rather than
a single value at a node. Therefore, tests for these fault models contain at
least two vectors, necessitating a change in the scan technique. This led to
broadside testing [69], where ATPG spreads to two cycles of logic, and the
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path under test is in the second cycle of logic. Nodes in the first cycle of
logic are used to produce the second vector needed to test the path. The need
for such constraints was overcome using enhanced scan [21]. Each enhanced
scan element contains two flops. However, research [47] shows that a large
portion of structurally testable delay faults (i.e., faults that are testable in
presence of scan) are actually functionally unsensitizable. Hence, using scan for
delay testing can lead to considerable yield loss due to overtesting. Moreover,
industrial results [25] show that at-speed functional tests are far more effective
in catching chips with delay defects. Therefore, there is a need to functionally
test chips for delay defects. We provide a technique to do so in this chapter.
Our technique consists of three main parts: a) a local Delay annotated
(PODEM based) Automatic Test Pattern Generator (DATPG) b) a functional
mapping procedure and c) an intelligent feedback mechanism. The fault model
we use is the improved unified fault model (IUFM) [43]. The faults in this
fault model, like any good small delay fault model, are actually paths. We
use DATPG to generate the locally true paths We read in the standard delay
format (SDF) files provided by the synthesis tool and annotate the synthesized
netlist with corresponding delays. DATPG provides the paths that have a
delay above a given threshold and are locally true. To ensure that defects
are not masked, we use the pseudo-robustness constraints. The paths along
with the pseudo-robustness constraints are given to the functional mapping
procedure to generate the instruction sequence (if one exists) that can test
the path. We apply the functional mapping procedure at the gate-level here.
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We do so because we found that in case of delay faults the tests generated
are more unlikely to be mapped. If the functional mapping procedure finds
the path is not pseudo-robustly testable then the feedback mechanism uses an
intelligent heuristic which takes advantage of the way DATPG generates paths,
to identify the sub-path which causes the path to be functionally untestable
and stores it. Any path which has this non-functional sub-path is discarded
quickly in the future. The results that we provide for non-functionality of
paths mean that those paths are not detectable with pseudo-robust conditions
under functional constraints within the given bound.
The contributions of this chapter are outlined below.
• We provide a fully automatic technique to generate instruction sequences
to pseudo-robustly test delay defects in processors.
• We read in standard formats (part of existing design flow); therefore,
this technique can be easily ported to any processor.
• We show that our technique can obtain 96% fault coverage efficiency on
the OR1200 processor design.
5.1 Background
5.1.1 Fault models
A good fault model is essential for any testing methodology. The stuck-
at fault model cannot adequately portray the effects of delay defects. Delay
defects are generally modeled by fault models like transition fault model [86],
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gate delay fault model [15] or path delay fault model [75]. Test generation
using transition fault model involves generating vectors for first initializing
the net under test to a value and then producing a transition on the same
net. Test vectors for this model will have a good coverage for gross delay
defects since nets with gross delay defect will fail to produce the required
transition. However, the paths through the nets that are activated by the
vectors might not be long (slow) enough to cause a failure in the presence of
a small delay defect. Therefore, the circuits with small delay defects might
escape detection. The gate delay fault model improves on this by targeting
only the longest path through each net. However, this model fails to cover
the cumulative effect of small delay defects distributed over several gates. The
path delay fault model targets those kinds of defects. Test generation using
this model involves generating tests for all the paths of the circuit under test.
However, the number of paths in a circuit can grow exponentially with the
number of nets in a circuit. Therefore, it is tough to generate vectors for all
the faults in this fault model. A new fault model, called improved unified
fault model (IUFM), was proposed in [43]. It involves generating tests for the
longest sensitizable path (both rising and falling) passing through all the nets
and also all the sensitizable paths above a certain threshold in the circuit. The
number of longest paths through each net is linear in terms of the number of
nets in the circuit. Moreover, by choosing an intelligent threshold, it is possible
to represent the effects of distributed small delay defects and also test for only
a moderate number of paths. Therefore, it is easier to achieve higher coverage
68
using this fault model. Hence, this fault model provides a good framework to
target small delay defects.
5.1.2 Delay tests
The tests for paths should have at least two vectors (V1,V2). The vector
V1 produces the necessary first cycle value at each net in the path as defined by
the transitions on the nets. In case of a delay defect, the transition is delayed
or absent in the chip, V2 propagates this information through the path to the
end of the path. The delay tests are classified into various ways as described
in [44]. Before explaining these classification we need to define a few terms.
Node: A node is a pair of a gate output and a transition (rising or falling).
Each node has a delay associated with it, as given by the SDF file.
Path: A path is a sequence of nodes and it has a delay associated with it. The
delay of a path is the sum of the delays of nodes in the path. The sequence
starts at a pseudo-input1 and ends at a pseudo-output2. There are no memory
elements on the path. The output of each gate in the path is connected to
an input of the succeeding gate in the sequence. The pseudo-input at the
beginning of the path is connected to an input of the first gate in the sequence
and the last gate in the sequence is connected to the pseudo-output.
Sub-path: Any sub-sequence of a path.
True path: A path is true if there is a test for it. A path can be locally or
1A primary input or an output of a memory element
2A primary output or an input to a memory element
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globally true, depending on whether a combinational or a sequential test exists
for it. In our case, a sequential test is a set of instruction sequences and the
wrong value must be propagated from the flop at the end of the path to an
observable point in processor (primary output, register file etc.).
On-input – A signal is on-input of path P if it is on P .
Off-input – A signal is off-input of path P if it is an input to a gate in P and
it is not an on-input. We also use the term side-input in this dissertation to
mean off-input.
Robust off-input – An off-input i of a gate on path P is a robust off-input
if either of the following conditions is satisfied (here j is the on-input to the
same gate):
1. If j transitions from a controlling value to a non-controlling value, i
should have the same transition or should have a stable (glitch free)
non-controlling value in both cycles of the test
2. If j transitions from a non-controlling value to a controlling value, i
should have a stable (glitch free) non-controlling value in the both cycles
of the test.
Non-robust off-input – An off-input of a gate on path P is a non-robust
off-input if it has a transition from controlling value to a non-controlling value
when the on-input has a transition from non-controlling value to a controlling
value. For example, in case of an AND gate, if the off-input is rising when the
on-input is falling, the off-input is a non-robust off-input. Note that, in this
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case, the transition will be propagated only when the off-input arrives earlier
than the on-input. Therefore, timing information will be necessary to make
sure that the test is valid.
Now we can explain the classifications of delay tests.
Robust tests: If a delay test for a path has all the values to make sure that
the transition is propagated through the path and also ensures that all
the off-inputs are robust off-inputs, then it is robust. A robust delay test
for a path can guarantee that a wrong value will be latched on to the
memory element at the end of the path when the path is too slow, even
when there are other delay faults in the circuit.
Non-robust tests: If a delay test for a path has all the values to make sure
that the transition is propagated through the path and at least one of the
off-inputs is a non-robust off-input, then it is non-robust. A non-robust
test can guarantee the detection of a delay fault when no other delay
fault is present.
It will be ideal if each path under test is robustly tested. However, it is not
practically possible to achieve such a goal. On the other hand, fault coverage
numbers using non-robust tests are not highly trustworthy. A robustness con-
dition in between these two would be a good solution. Such a condition, called
pseudo-robust, has gained some recent traction [83], [6]. Pseudo-robust tests
have robustness conditions similar to that of robust tests. However, the re-






This test might cause a glitch in ’d’
Figure 5.1: A test which is pseudo-robust but not robust
test is given which is not robust but pseudo-robust because the signal value
in d can have a glitch. In this dissertation, we will deal with pseudo-robust
excitation in case of delay tests.
5.2 Technique
Our technique for delay test generation has two phases since IUFM is
used. In the first phase, all the paths above a preset threshold are functionally
mapped. All the nodes in the mapped paths are said to be covered. In the
second, the longest path through each uncovered node is mapped.
The block diagram of the technique is given in Figure 5.2. As shown in
the figure, we start with the synthesized netlist and the SDF file. These are
the inputs to the preprocessing step which annotates each net in the netlist
with the delays (for all transitions at the net) as given by the SDF file. This
step also determines the threshold to be given to the DATPG.
In the first phase of test generation, DATPG generates all the locally















Figure 5.2: Block diagram of the technique
period) and calls the mapping procedure to generate instruction sequences
that detect those paths. In the second phase, DATPG is given a threshold
and a modified circuit such that all the locally true paths above the threshold
contain the node being targeted. DATPG generates those paths and dynam-
ically updates the threshold with a path’s delay if that path is found to be
functionally mappable. In both phases, if a path is found to be functionally
unmappable, the feedback mechanism finds a sub-path that is non-functional.
This non-functional sub-path is stored so that, in the future, all the paths that
contain this sub-path are not given to the functional mapping procedure. We
will now explain the main blocks of this technique.
5.2.1 DATPG
Before going into the details of DATPG, we will elaborate on the need
for such a procedure. Traditionally, delay testing for path delay faults contains
two parts, a) path generation using static timing analysis (STA) methods and














Figure 5.3: Illustration of difference between STA and delay testing.
engineering issues with using STA tools in delay testing.
• STA and delay testing need different kinds of paths. In Figure 5.3(a), the
AND gate has two rising transitions at the input. STA will choose only
one path, qr, since q arrives later than p and hence causes the transition
in r. However, for pseudo-robust tests, both the paths qr and pr must be
considered, since if a delay fault causes either transition to be absent, the
transition in the output will be absent. Figure 5.3(b) shows another case.
In this case neither path mo nor path no are pseudo-robust. However,
STA will provide the path mo.
• STA is meant to be used to derive a conservative estimate of the clock
period. Therefore, paths due to glitches will be considered. For example,
let us suppose a test causes the transitions illustrated in Figure 5.3(c).
STA will consider this as a test for path yz. However, the path yz has a
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transition in it only if a glitch occurs in x because of the late arrival of
v. Let us suppose this path and vector are chosen for delay test. Now,
if due to process variations on the manufactured chip, signal v arrives
earlier, there is no glitch on x and it is a stable zero. This will imply that
there is no transition on output z. This is the correct operation intended
by the designer for the given inputs. However, our delay test will fail the
chip since the glitch did not occur. Therefore, in the presence of process
variations, considering glitch based paths for delay testing might lead to
problems.
• Using a STA tool would mean that the test generation will be separate
from the path selection. This can lead to loss of coverage. Moreover,
most STA tools are not optimized to find locally true paths.
Our test generator is based on PODEM and uses a delay based heuristic
for propagation [39]. As described in section 5.1.2, delay tests have two vectors.
The first vector sets the required value in the first clock cycle and the second
vector is for propagation. If we have rising (falling) transition, the second
vector has conditions for propagation of a stuck-at-0 (stuck-at-1) fault. If the
transitions are always at the input, a single cycle PODEM algorithm simulates
the delay test generation algorithm. For targeting transitions at an internal
node, we increase the delay of that node so that all the long paths contain that
node. The flowchart of DATPG is shown in Figure 5.4. This flowchart does
not show the feedback from the mapping procedure. The terms backtrace,
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backtrack, D-frontier and x-path hold the same meaning as in the traditional
PODEM algorithm. The shaded boxes show the areas where the algorithm
differs from traditional PODEM.
The DATPG procedure deals with the circuit as a combinational design
and backtraces (implies) only up to flop outputs (inputs). Before we start the
ATPG procedure, we do a computation to figure at each node, the maximum
possible delay of a path through that node. This is a linear time computation.
Each node has a source and a sink delay. The source delay of a (pseudo) input
is zero and sink delay of a (pseudo) output is zero. The source and sink delays
of the rest of the nodes are computed iteratively. The source delay of a node is
the sum of maximum of source delays of all fanin nodes and the propagation
delay of the node. Similar computation is done for sink delays using fanouts
of each gate. The maximum possible delay of a path containing a node is a
function of its source, sink and propagation delays. We use these delay values
during ATPG as described below.
As shown in Figure 5.4, we keep inserting transitions (stuck-at faults)
at the input and propagate them. The choice of input/transition is made based
on decreasing order of the sink delays of the combination. After implication, if
we find that no output has a transition, we know that we have to propagate the
transition through some D-frontier. If no D-frontier is present, that means the
transition is not propagatable any more and we need to backtrack. However,
if a D-frontier is present, we choose the D-frontier for propagation based on
the source/sink delay heuristic. The backtrace is done in a similar way to
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general PODEM algorithms. If we find that a transition is propagated to
an output, we try to find all the paths that have been simulated3. If such
a path’s delay is greater than the given threshold, it is checked against the
non-functional sub-path database to find if it contains any of them. If it does
not contain any non-functional sub-path, it is given to the functional mapping
procedure. A change from traditional PODEM is that we do not stop when an
input transition has been propagated once; we continue till all possible paths
starting with that input transition longer than the threshold delay are found.
The updating of threshold is not shown in the flowchart. In the second phase
of test generation, the threshold is updated with the delay of a path when
that path is found to be functional, so that we can target the longest paths
through the node.
5.2.2 Functional mapping procedure
Once it is ascertained that a path above threshold does not contain
any non-functional sub-paths, we invoke the functional mapping procedure to
map it to instructions. The procedure is similar to the one described in pre-
vious chapters with some changes. The main difference is that the mapping
uses the gate-level model now. We generate a similar LTL property of the
form (C =⇒ O). C in the property contains the path controllability con-
straints, pseudo-robustness constraints and instruction constraints. O includes
3All the sequences of gates starting at the input and ending at any output with transitions



















































L1    #define legal (insn_input == ‘add) || (insn_input == ‘sub)
L2    if (‘legal&&(m==0)&&(o==0)&&(p==0)&&(q==0)) begin
L9        end
L10  end
L8            ‘All_outputs_equal;
L3        prop_check = 1;
L4        wait(1);
L5        if (‘legal&&(m==1)&&(o==1)&&(p==0)&&(q==1)begin
L7            wait(1);
L6            prop_check = 0;
Figure 5.5: Illustration of functional mapping
the observability constraints. An example of the constraint extraction is given
Figure 5.5. Figure 5.5(a) shows a path produced by DATPG, Figure 5.5(b)
shows the property generated to map the path and Figure 5.5(c) shows the
modification done to the design given to SMV-BMC for observability.
5.2.2.1 Generating antecedent
C, the antecedent of the final property contains the path controllability,
pseudo-robustness constraints and instruction constraints. We derive the con-
trollability constraints directly from the path. For example, let us suppose the
path given by DATPG looks like Figure 5.5(a). The controllability constraints
for the path are: m rising, o rising, q rising. This is built into the if conditions
of the property as shown in lines L2 and L5 of the property in Figure 5.5(b).
The wait statement of line L4 specifies that condition in L5 should happen
one cycle after the condition in line L2. It can be seen that the conditions for
m,o and q are as required. Now we need to generate the pseudo-robustness
constraints. This requires additional specification if any gate in the path has
a transition ending in a controlling value. In the example, rising input of the
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OR gate is such a transition. Therefore, we must specify that other input must
have non-controlling values. This is why p is specified to stable ’0’ value in the
conditions of lines L2 and L5. We also add the instruction constraints. This
is done by making sure at every cycle instruction input is a legal instruction.
This is illustrated in Figure 5.5(b), if there are only two legal instructions (‘add
and ‘sub). Now we have C of the final property.
5.2.2.2 Boolean difference for observability
We use Boolean difference to express the observability constraints. We
transform the design using the fault shadow methodology described in [49]. In
this method all the logic in the forward cone of faulty net are duplicated. In
our case the forward cone of the last node in the path will be duplicated. This
is shown in Figure 5.5(c). In [49], the faulty value is always fed to one cone
and the correct value is fed to another. Conditions to make outputs of these
cones different are then found. However, we deal with sequential logic and in
our case fault is triggered (when the path is excited) in only one cycle (the
second cycle of the transitions in path). Therefore, we introduce a multiplexer
which propagates the faulty value in only one cycle and in the other cycles
propagates the value evaluated from the circuit. For this purpose, new signals
prop and prop check are introduced. We now add an assertion that the outputs
of correct and fault shadow logic are always equal (line L8). This assertion is
the consequent O of the property .
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5.2.2.3 Using a bounded model checker
We pass the property generated in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 to a
bounded model checker (SMV-BMC in our case) along with the transformed
(as explained in Section 5.2.2.2) design. We give a bound to the bounded model
checker based on the maximum number of cycles an instruction can be present
in the pipeline of the processor in the absence of stalls. A counterexample,
if produced by the bounded model checker, will simulate the path because it
will satisfy C. Therefore, path controllability and robustness constraints will
be satisfied. The assertion in O will be falsified; therefore, the value of some
output signal is different in the faulty and correct versions. Therefore, the path
effect is propagated. As explained in the previous chapters, the instructional
constraints in C will make sure that the counterexample is possible through
legal instructions. The instruction sequence for detecting the path is present
in the counterexample, which is easily extracted.
5.2.3 Feedback
The technique has a feedback loop from the mapping procedure to
DATPG. Without the feedback loop DATPG might repeatedly provide very
similar functionally untestable paths. The time taken to map a path to in-
structions is far higher than the time taken to generate the path using DATPG.
Therefore, any time a path can be rejected as functionally untestable without
actually mapping it, much time and effort can be saved. We make use of the
fact that:
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A sub − path of path P is functionally uncontrollable
=⇒
Path P is functionally uncontrollable
This is because a path can be seen as a conjunction of a set of predicates
on gate outputs. Any sub-path of the path is a conjunction of a sub-set of
predicates. Therefore, the sub-path is a weaker conjunction. If a weaker
conjunction is unsatisfiable under a set of environmental conditions4, then the
stronger conjunction is also unsatisfiable. Therefore, a path is functionally
uncontrollable if any sub-path of it is functionally uncontrollable.
It will be advantageous to maintain a database of sub-paths that are
functionally uncontrollable. This will necessitate a procedure to find the non-
functional sub-paths of a functionally uncontrollable path. There are n(n+1)
2
possible sub-paths for a path of n nodes. We do not want to check if each
of those sub-paths is functionally mappable, since it can cause the time taken
to quadratically increase. Therefore, we propose an intelligent heuristic. This
heuristic takes advantage of the way paths are generated by DATPG. As ex-
plained in Section 5.2.1, each run of DATPG starts with a transition at an
input and finds all possible ways that transition can be propagated to out-
puts. Therefore, the initial parts of the consecutive paths are likely to be the
same. We try to find a sub-path starting at the input that is functionally
uncontrollable. However, there are n possible such sub-paths and trying the
mapping process on all of them can also be time consuming for large designs
4Constraints derived from the ISA and functional environment
82
where each path can have more than 50-100 nodes. To avoid this, we do a
logarithmic reduction where we start with the first half of the path and recur-
sively test the controllability of the first half of the sub-path. We stop as soon
as we reach the sub-path that is functionally controllable. The pseudo-code
for this procedure is given below.
Find_subpath(path,N) {
//Get sub-path starting at input half








The initial parameters to this function are the original path and n. This
procedure will result in only log(n) functional controllability checks. Note that
we do only functional controllability checks in this feedback procedure. This
controllability check is similar to the mapping described in Section 5.2.2. The
only difference is that we do not provide the observability constraints to the
mapping procedure, i.e., we make O (the consequent) trivially falsifiable in
the property given to the bounded model checker. This procedure may not
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return the smallest possible sub-path starting at input that is functionally
uncontrollable. However, that is a trade-off if we want to limit the number
of functional controllability checks. However, since the initial halving of the
paths might discard lot of nodes, we add an additional check. If the initial
half-path is functionally controllable then we intersect the current path with
the previous untestable path and check for its functional controllability.
5.3 Experimental results
We performed our experiments again on the OR1200 processor. We
synthesized OR1200 using a 0.18u technology available from TSMC. Some
details about the synthesized OR1200 processor core are provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: An overview of the synthesized OR1200 design
No. of instructions in OR1200 ISA 92
No. of combinational gates 15878
in the synthesized design
No. of sequential elements 1594
in the synthesized design
Bound that we used for our experiments is 7. We used a threshold of
80% of the clock cycle for the first phase of testing. The results of first phase are
given in Table 5.2. The first column shows the number of paths that were found
to be above the threshold by DATPG. As explained in Section 5.2.1, DATPG
tries to propagate all possible input/transition combinations using PODEM.
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Table 5.2: Results of Phase 1 of experiment
No. of Drop Functionally Functionally Time
Paths Testable Redundant out
27424 12 15118 12106 200
The second column shows the number of such combinations for which DATPG
reached a backtrack limit of 10000. 15118 paths of the 27424 were found to
be functionally testable, as shown in third column. 12106 of the paths were
found to be functionally untestable (hence functionally redundant5) and the
mapping procedure timed out for 200 of the paths (timeout limit used was
150 seconds). Those results are depicted in the fourth and fifth columns of
Table 5.2.
In the second phase, we generated the longest functionally testable
path though each node not covered in first phase. We did this for nodes in
four modules of OR12006. The results are shown in Table 5.3. The first
column shows the name of the module. The number of paths that were found
to be functionally testable for each module while performing this experiment
is shown in the second column. The similar number for functionally redundant
paths is given in the third column. The next (fourth) column gives the number
of paths that were rejected because the feedback technique found that those
paths contained a sub-path that was already deemed non-functional. In the
5Within the given bound
6Even though a node may belong to a module, the mapping procedure considers the
entire OR1200 while checking the path.
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last column, we give the node coverage efficiency N . N denotes the percentage
of nodes in the module for which the mapping attempt either produced a
instruction sequence to test a long path through the node or all the paths
through it (given by DATPG) were found to be functionally untestable the
given bound. N provides a way of separating the efficiency of the mapping
technique from that of the DATPG. N is the fault coverage provided by our
mapping technique for the IUFM, if it is given all the paths that it needs, in
other words, N would be the actual fault coverage if the DATPG procedure
never aborts7.
Table 5.3: Results for Phase 2 of experiments
Module Functionally Functionally Rejected N
Testable Redundant Sub-paths (%)
or1200 ctrl 1826 29191 68087 90.6
or1200 alu 1427 16985 2716 100
or1200 lsu 970 4077 3744 100
or1200 wbmux 1146 2285 2118 100
We can see from the last column of the table that we achieved 100%
coverage efficiency in all the modules except for the or1200 ctrl module.
or1200 ctrl contains the complex decoding logic and the pipeline glue logic.
Therefore, the procedure procedure backtracked a lot more times. Even then,
we were able to get a coverage efficiency of 90% on this module. The overall
coverage efficiency for the four modules is 96%.
7We had set a backtrack limit of 10000 for the DATPG procedure
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Overall results of the delay test mapping experiments are shown in
Table 5.4. It provides the final coverage efficiency and the average time taken
for mapping. It also gives the number of times the DATPG procedure hit
the backtrack limit of 10000 and the number of times the mapping procedure
timed out as a percentage of number of paths considered.




Backtrack limit reached 2.6%
Timedout 0.7%
5.4 Discussions
In this chapter, we adapted our technique for generating instruction
sequences to generate pseudo-robust tests for delay faults in a processor. We
introduced an ATPG-based delay test generator, and a feedback mechanism
into our instruction mapping technique for this purpose. We demonstrated our
technique on the OR1200 processor, where we achieved a coverage efficiency
of 96% for delay faults for the four modules that we tested. As pointed out in
the previous chapters, the significance of this coverage is increased due to the
findings of Maxwell et al. [55].
We mapped the paths into instructions in this chapter. The faulty
value has already been propagated to the endpoint of the paths before we
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start mapping. This makes it more probable that in many cases, test gener-
ated for exciting the path may be sufficient to propagate it to an observable
output. Performing excitation only instruction mapping decreases the burden
on the mapping considerably (as evidenced by the experimental results shown
in Chapter 4). We undertake this experiment and suggest further techniques
for efficient test generation in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Efficient generation of instruction sequences
Generating compact tests is an important factor to reduce the test costs
due to the following reasons.
• Test application time (TAT) determines a large part of test cost. As
mentioned earlier, loading the cache with data from the tester takes
place at a slower speed than the actual running of tests on the processor.
Typically, loading of the cache uses the majority of the test application
time (TAT) [3]. Reducing the number of instructions is the only way to
address this issue.
• Test data volume (TDV) determines the memory requirement of the
ATE. ATE costs are highly related to the memory requirements. There-
fore, it is imperative to reduce the TDV.
The number of faults in a good delay fault model is typically quite larger than
the number of stuck-at faults. Therefore, it is even more important to have
efficient test generation in case of delay faults. This problem of efficient test
generation for delay faults is handled in this chapter.
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In the following sections, we will describe a technique for test generation
which makes it more probable that each test detects multiple paths. We
also do further experiments upon the approach of the Chapter 5. We used
Boolean difference for fault propagation in that Chapter. This might lead
to exponential increase in the effort spent on mapping in some cases. We
eschew the Boolean difference based approach that ensures propagation and
use a path based fault simulation technique for the propagation check. In
effect, we use excitation (or controllability) only mapping and check whether
propagation of the faulty value has been collaterally ensured by such tests.
We then supplement the test generation process by adding a technique that
makes each test more probable to detect additional delay faults. This helps
in reducing the test content. This methodology of test content reduction is
complementary to any code compression based techniques [3].
6.1 Test generation technique
As in Chapter 5, we use IUFM as our fault model and use DATPG for
our local true path generation. In the interest of more efficiency, we make a
minor modification. We use a threshold of 90% in the first phase and generate
a sorted (in the decreasing order of delay) list of longer paths through a node
in the second phase.
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6.1.1 Instruction mapping procedure
Paths generated by the DATPG procedure are mapped to instructions.
In the first phase, all paths generated by DATPG undergo the mapping. In
the second phase, the paths are mapped in a sorted order starting from the
longest path and stopping as soon as a mappable path is found. The mapping
procedure uses the bounded model checker for only controllability and uses
simulation for observability. The controllability only mapping also specifies
a property of the form (C =⇒ O). The antecedent C, specifies the same
constraints as in Chapter 5. However, the consequent O is trivially false. We
do not modify the design.
6.1.1.1 Propagation through simulation
Traditional fault simulation techniques cannot be used in case of delay
faults. Fault simulation using path saboteurs was proposed in [6]. We adapt
that for our technique. Creating path saboteurs involves modifying the netlist
in such a way that if the path under test is excited, the flop at the end of the
path latches in the wrong value. The path saboteur can also made in such
a way that it flop latches in the wrong value only when pseudo-robustness
conditions are met. An example of a path saboteur (checking for pseudo-
robust conditions) is shown in Figure 6.1. The shaded gates are the gates
introduced for path saboteur. The original circuit has two AND gates and an
OR gate. The path under test has a rising transition passing through these








Figure 6.1: Path saboteur checking for pseudo-robust conditions
first gate and pseudo-robustly propagated1 through the rest of the gates, then
the select signal of the multiplexer placed at the end of the path is one. In
this case, the flop latches on to the wrong value, and hence the transition will
be absent at the output of the path. We take the test sequence generated in
Section 6.1.1 and generate a testbench. We simulate this testbench twice, once
when the netlist has not been sabotaged and once with the sabotage. If the
outputs of the circuit are different in these two simulations then the path has
1Note that OR gate’s side-input is checked for values in both cycles
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been detected.
6.2 Test content reduction
Using IUFM reduces the number of faults to be detected when com-
pared to using the path delay fault model. However, the number of faults
targeted can still be large. Hence, test content reduction is important. We
attempt to reduce the test content in two different ways: a) fault simulation
b) increasing probability of multiple path detection during test generation.
While attempting test content reduction, we target only those paths for which
a test was produced by using the technique outlined in Section 6.1. We call
these paths as critical paths.
6.2.1 Test content reduction via simulation
In this part of the technique we identify all the critical paths that can
be detected by the tests that were generated, using fault simulation. If we
use the simulation technique in Section 6.1.1.1 as is, we would need one good
netlist simulation and one sabotaged netlist simulation per critical path for
each test. Therefore, if there are n critical paths we need n + 1 simulations
per test. To reduce the need for n sabotaged netlist simulations we propose
a new kind of path saboteurs. We call these the excitation saboteurs because
they check only for path excitation. An example is shown in Figure 6.2. The
difference between the original path saboteurs (Figure 6.1) and the excita-







Figure 6.2: Path saboteur checking for excitation only pseudo-robust condi-
tions
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saboteur. This makes sure that the faulty value is not latched on to the flop.
The check signal goes high when the path is excited with pseudo-robust con-
ditions. The advantage of the excitation saboteur is that many paths can be
checked for excitation together in one simulation by monitoring the check sig-
nals corresponding to each path. For every test generated, we create excitation
saboteurs for all the paths and identify the paths that are excited by the test.
We then create full saboteurs for those paths individually and verify whether
those paths are also propagated by the test. The algorithm for this is given
below.
STEP 1: Choose a test and create a testbench
STEP 2: Create excitation saboteurs for all paths
STEP 3: Simulate the sabotaged circuit
STEP 4: Store response R. Identify the paths excited
STEP 5: Repeat for each excited path P steps 6 through to 8
STEP 6: Create full path saboteur for P
STEP 7: Simulate circuit
STEP 8: Compare response to R. If responses different path P is
detected
6.2.2 Multiple path targeting
Now that we have found all the critical paths detected by the tests, we
try to increase the probability that each test detects more paths. We do this by
changing the constraints given to the bounded model checker. Note that the
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pseudo-robust conditions allow the side-inputs to transition if the on-input
transitions to a non-controlling value. We take advantage of this by mak-
ing these side-input transitions a requirement in the constraints given to the
bounded model checker. Therefore, the test generated by the mapping tech-
nique will have more transitions, increasing the probability that some other
critical path will now be pseudo-robustly detected. However, if we specify
this on all feasible side-inputs, it becomes highly likely that such constraints
cannot be satisfied and test cannot be generated. Therefore, we try to iden-
tify the side-inputs that can be allowed to transition with minimal effects on
the testability of the path. We do this by gathering the support-set of each
side-input. The support set of a signal is all the signals that are in the back-
ward combinational cone of influence of the signal. We allow a side-input to
transition iff its support set is independent of the support sets of all other
side-inputs and the nodes on the path. Computation of the support sets is
fairly straight forward using a depth first search algorithm. Therefore, the
computation overhead is very low.
6.3 Experimental results
We performed our experiments on the OR1200 processor. We used the
same synthesized design as in Section 5.3. We also used the same bound (7)
as in Section 5.3. We used a threshold of 90% of the clock cycle for the first
phase of testing. The results of first phase are given in Table 6.1. The first
column shows the number of paths that were found to be above the threshold
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Table 6.1: Results of Phase 1 of experiment
No. of Functionally Functionally Excitation P
Paths Testable Untestable Only (%)
2998 1891 1105 2 99.9
by DATPG, which were 2998 in number. As shown in the second column 1891
of these paths was found to have a test, whereas 1105 of the paths did not have
test within the given bound (shown in the third column). The fourth column
shows that, for 2 paths, our technique found a test for excitation. However,
these two tests did not guarantee propagation. The fifth column gives the path
efficiency P . We calculate the path efficiency as follows.




where E denotes the number of paths for which we found excitation only
sequences and T is the number of paths for which mapping was attempted.
Therefore, P gives the frequency with which the new technique gives a result,
i.e., either gives a test which detects (excites and propagates) the path or
computes the path to be functionally untestable within the given bound. This
is nearly 100% as shown in the last column.
All the nodes in the paths for which a test generated in the first phase
were denoted as covered. In the second phase, we generated the longest func-
tionally testable path through each node not covered in first phase. We did
this for nodes in four modules of OR1200. The results are shown in Table 6.2.
The first column shows the name of the module. The second column gives
the number of paths in each module that were found to be functional. Note
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that we stop the process for a node when a functional path is found through
it going in decreasing order of path delays. Therefore, this column also shows
the nodes covered in the second phase. The third column gives the number of
paths for which the tests we found only excited the path. The fourth column
gives the number of paths on which the instruction mapping was attempted
per each module. The fifth column gives the path efficiency P . In the last
column, we give the node coverage efficiency N , calculated as explained in
Section 5.3. The overall number are 96% and 98% for P and N respectively.
Table 6.2: Results for Phase 2 of experiments
Module Functional Excitation Total P N
Paths Only Paths (%) (%)
or1200 ctrl 619 4554 110242 96 93
or1200 alu 365 510 2181 77 99
or1200 lsu 124 0 3138 100 100
or1200 wbmux 364 267 27345 99 99
Important result to be noted here is the fact that the mapping always pro-
duced a result, i.e., there were no timeouts. One other result not shown in the
table is we got a lower bound on transition fault coverage, which was 92% for
the four modules. We derived this by parsing through the paths produced by
the mapping technique and identifying the nodes in all the paths. This is a
lower bound on the transition fault coverage because the test for a path might
have toggled other nodes (which are not part of critical paths), that were not
monitored. Note that this number is less than the node coverage efficiency
N because of the aborts in the DATPG due to the backtrack limit that we
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set (which was 1000). The stuck-at fault coverage is also at least 92% since
transition faults are a superset of the stuck-at faults.
We applied both the test content reduction techniques that were de-
scribed in Section 6.2. We started with 3388 tests that were generated during
both phases of the test generation. The first technique was to use the iterative
path saboteur based fault simulation technique described in Section 6.2.1. We
found that this reduced the number of tests to 1688. We generated tests for the
paths using the technique described in Section 6.2.2. We found that there are
only limited number of critical paths which have side-inputs with no common
shared backward logic with any other side-input. Therefore, we augmented
the technique with more iterations. To do so, we sorted the side-inputs in
decreasing order of number of side-inputs each one shared logic with. After
each iteration, we dropped the top node in this sorted list and found the nodes
which now do not share any logic with any other side-input in the list. We did
this three times. Iteration 0 was our base technique with no augmentation.
The results of this are given in the Table 6.3. The first column in the table
gives the iteration number. The second column gives the number of paths
that have some side-input which can be forced to have a transition at each
iteration. The third column gives the number of paths that were found to
be functionally excitable. The fourth column gives the number of paths that
were also propagated to an observable point. We used these tests and again
applied the technique described in Section 6.2.1. We found that this reduced
the number of tests required to detect the critical paths to 1676. The further
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Table 6.3: Results of each iteration of multi-path targeting
Iteration No. of Excited Functional
Paths
0 1439 657 562
1 2388 1490 1004
2 2823 1906 1507
3 3462 2352 1939
compression achieved is low because the original tests that were generated
were good at detecting multiple paths. The overall test content reduction that
was achieved was 49.4%.
The test content reductions described are complementary to code com-
pression techniques. To demonstrate this we applied some code compression
techniques on the 1676 tests that were found in the previous experiment. The
following encoding schemes were used: Huffman encoding, run length encoding
and lzw encoding. An 8-bit symbol length is used for the Huffman encoding.
Both character level and bit level encoding schemes were implemented for run
length encoding. Runs of bytes were encoded in character level run length
encoding. In binary run length encoding, 2-bit and 3-bit codewords encoding
runs of 0’s were used. 2-bit and 3-bit codewords encoding runs of 0’s and runs
of 1’s alternatingly were also used for bit level encoding. For lzw, window sizes
of 256 bytes, 1024 bytes, 4096 bytes and 16384 bytes were used. To estimate
the theoretical limit to the compressibility of the instruction sequences, we
also calculated the entropy of the sequences using a symbol size of 32 bits.
The results are shown in the graph of Figure 6.3. Compressions shown in the
graph also include the compression provided by our technique. We see that
100
Figure 6.3: Compression achieved by code compression techniques
we compress the tests to 25% of original size. Further information regarding
many of these code compression technique and the overheads involved can be
obtained in [3].
6.4 Discussion
In this paper, we developed a technique for efficiently generating com-
pact instruction sequences to pseudo-robustly test a processor for delay faults.
We demonstrated our technique on an OR1200 processor, where we achieved
a coverage efficiency of 98% of delay faults on four modules. The test content
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reduction techniques compressed the tests from 3388 to 1676, a reduction of
50.6%. The advantage of these test content reduction techniques is that they
do not involve any memory/performance overhead during the test application
process. Moreover, these techniques are complementary to any existing code
compression technique, which was also demonstrated (achieving an overall
compression of 75%).
We found that majority of the tests generated detected multiple paths
without any additional constraints. One of the reasons for this is the netlist
was not optimally synthesized. Therefore, most of the critical paths go through
same part of the design. We expect that our multiple path targeting technique
will achieve a lot of further content reduction on more optimized designs.
102
Chapter 7
Testing the non-processor cores of an SOC
In this chapter, we will present a comprehensive solution to test an em-
bedded processor based SOC. The techniques outlined in the previous chapters
for testing a processor can be used to test the embedded processor of an SOC.
Therefore, we will now direct our efforts towards providing a solution to test
the other cores in an SOC.
We will use the processor to deliver the tests and collect the responses,
in other words, the processor will be our test source and sink. Our technique
does not need any boundary scan [78] or any wrappers [45] around the cores
being tested. This gives us the advantage of not requiring any modifications
to the SOC design. Moreover, with the processor accessing the cores in the
normal operating manner, the test will be at-speed.
As described in Chapter 2, others have proposed techniques for testing
the SOC using processor with functional access. However, unlike those meth-
ods our technique very suited for black-box testing of the other cores. Our
technique does not need any knowledge of the internal logic of a core. It needs
only the sequences that can test the IP core. Since most of the other cores are
bought from intellectual property vendors, they are generally available only as
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black-boxes. Therefore, black-box testing of IP cores is important.
The test vectors that we need for our technique might be of any kind.
It might be the validation vectors used during the design of the cores or any
other vectors that can test the IP core functionally. We parse those vectors and
map them into instructions which when executed by the embedded processor
will produce those vectors at the inputs of the non-processor cores.
The technique detailed in the following sections can also be used to
test IP cores that are available as white-box or grey-box. In those cases,
we can even have a hierarchical approach. In the hierarchical approach we
can generate the test vectors using ATPG tools and then map them by the
proposed method.
We will illustrate the effectiveness of the technique using an SOC that
we designed. The SOC has an ARM core, memory and an AES cryptography
core. We map some testbenches of the AES core and show that the coverage
that we achieve in the SOC environment is within 0.5% of coverage achieved
by the testbenches on just the core.
7.1 Our SOC testing methodology
Block diagram of an SOC is shown in Figure 7.1. As shown in the figure,
in general an SOC has a embedded processor communicating to other cores via
a system bus. In general, the other cores are the intellectual property of various











Figure 7.1: Design of a generic SOC
core has a corresponding driver program written in a high level programming
language like C which allows the processor to communicate with it. Those
driver programs take in data values to be sent to the IP core as input during
the transmit operation and then produce the set of instructions that make
the processor deliver those values to the IP core through the bus. During the
receive operation the driver program will read in the data at the output of the
IP core and make it available to the processor via the bus.










Figure 7.2: SOC test flow proposed by our technique
in Figure 7.2. We start with a set of test stimuli. These test stimuli can
be gathered from anywhere. It may be the test vectors provided by the IP
vendor in case of a black-box core or it may be verification/validation vectors
generated during the design of the core. In case no such vectors exist, it might
be generated by applying ATPG algorithms to the core. Irrespective of the
source of the vectors, we use them as the starting point in our SOC test flow.
We use these vectors as the input to our reverse driver program.
7.1.1 Reverse driver
A driver program takes in data to be sent to the core and produces the
instructions that will send the data to the core. Our reverse driver takes in the
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Table 7.1: Description of the registers inside the core
Address Functionality
0 Control register
1 Data bits 31 to 24
2 Data bits 23 to 16
3 Data bits 15 to 8
4 Data bits 7 to 0
test stimuli as it is supposed to appear at the inputs of the core and provides the
data values that can be give to the driver program to get the instructions that
will send the test stimuli to the core. The reverse driver program is specific to
a core like the driver program. For the purposes of illustration, let us suppose
that the IP core being tested is a peripheral device that communicates with the
external environment. Let us suppose it can send/receive 32 bits of data at 4
different baud rates. Assume that the bus interface allows the communication
to be of only 8-bits address/data between the IP core and the processor. To
facilitate communication with the processor (via the bus) the IP core has an
arrangement of five registers that have functions as described in Table 7.1. The
control register at address zero specifies the speed (last 2 bits) of transfer and
also whether the operation is send/receive (third least significant bit). The
rest of the registers provide the data that is sent/received. Table 7.2 shows an
example test sequence provided by the vendor. Our reverse driver for this core
will parse this test sequence and identify that it requires a send operation at
the third speed rate from the data sent to the address 0x00. From the rest of
the test sequence it will get the data to be sent, which is 0x54DF7178. This
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data will then be given to the next step of our technique.
7.1.2 Generating the software to be loaded into the processor
The reverse driver program has parsed through the test sequence to
decipher the data to be sent to the core. Now we have to write the software
that does that. We know that the driver program for a core takes in the
data that needs to be sent to the core and provides the instructions to do so.
We use this functionality of the driver program for our purpose. We give the
data generated by the reverse driver to the driver program of the core. The
driver program will then generate the instructions necessary to produce the
test sequence at the core inputs.
The driver program is in general provided for each core or is written by
the designers as part of the SOC development process. Therefore, the writing
of the driver program is not an overhead associated with our methodology.
Our reverse driver program will have to parse through the test stimuli and
produce data values in a format readable by the driver program. This is the
only overhead associated with our process.
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7.2 Simulation and coverage measurement
Now that we have a methodology to generate the software to be loaded
into the processor for test, we need a technique to measure the coverage of the
resulting sequences. For this purpose, we use the generally used simulation
and fault simulation techniques. We first simulate the platform after loading
the instructions we have generated into the processor. During this simulation
we monitor the inputs of the core and grab the signals that arrive there. Once
the simulation is done, we fault simulate the core alone using the vectors that
we have grabbed at the boundaries.
This technique for fault coverage estimation is generic and portable to
any SOC. The simulation that we use to grab the vectors at the input of the
cores is the popular methodology used while validating the SOC design. We
also use the normally used fault simulation methods to arrive at our coverage.
We use the fault simulation on the core alone. This makes fault simulation
feasible on large SOC designs. Note that gate level structural fault simulation
is possible only for grey-box or white-box cores. For black-box cores, we can
attempt a functional fault simulation.
7.3 Implementation
To show the effectiveness of our methodology we implemented an SOC
using an ARM core [35], memory and an AES core available from open-
cores [89]. The block diagram of the implemented SOC is shown in Figure 7.3.








Figure 7.3: SOC containing ARM and AES cores
Wishbone interface (also available through opencores). We use the 128-bit
AES core which takes in 128-bit data and key for encryption and decryp-
tion. The AES core was memory mapped while integrating with the SOC.
The Wishbone interface allows 32-bit transmission through it. We will now
illustrate our technique on this SOC.
7.3.1 Reverse driver for the AES core
The AES interface with Wishbone facilitates the transfer between 128-
bit AES core and the 32-bit Wishbone interface by having 32-bit registers
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reset aes wb stb i aes wb we i aes wb cyc i aes wb adr i aes wb dat i
1 1 1 1 0x0004 0x3462
1 0 0 0 0x0004 0x3462
1 1 1 1 0x0008 0xCD23
1 0 0 0 0x0008 0xCD23
1 1 1 1 0x000C 0xAB12
1 0 0 0 0x000C 0xAB12
1 1 1 1 0x0010 0x1289
1 0 0 0 0x0010 0x1289
. . . . ...... ......
Figure 7.4: A test sequence
to store the data. There are a total of 9 registers, 4 each to hold the data
and the key values, and one to act as the control register. Separate ad-
dresses are assigned to each of these registers. An example sequence that
occurs during the simulation of our SOC is given in Figure 7.4. aes wb stb i,
aes wb we i,aes wb cyc i are all control signals from the Wishbone bus indi-
cating whether the core has been activated and whether the current operation
is read/write. The aes wb adr i, aes wb dat i are the address and the data
signals respectively. Our reverse driver will parse this sequence and whenever
the core is activated will parse the address and data signals to correctly iden-
tify what data is to be sent in. Parsing the the example sequence the reverse
driver will interpret the data of 0x3462CD23AB121289 to be sent to the AES.
7.3.2 Generating the software to be sent to AES
While designing the SOC, we also designed driver programs that take
in data or key to be sent to the core and generates an instruction sequence
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Table 7.3: Information regarding the AES core implemented
No. of inputs 69
No. of outputs 33
No. of combinational 9225
primitives
No. of sequential 1119
primitives
No. of uncollapsed 64070
faults
using the ARM ISA to send those values to the AES core. During our test
generation process, we give this driver program the outputs generated by the
reverse driver program. The validation sequence might also necessitate the
reading in the values generated by the AES core. We also have driver programs
for that purpose which we use.
7.4 Experiments
As described in Section 7.3, we implemented an SOC using an ARM
core and an AES cryptography core. The AES core and ARM processor were
both written in Verilog. The AES core also had wrapper allowing it to interact
with the Wishbone interface. We synthesized the AES core using a 0.18u
technology. The data regarding the synthesized AES core is given in Table 7.3.
To validate our SOC design we wrote a few testbenches. These test-
benches generated random 128-bit values for data and key. We used the same
key to encrypt and decrypt the result of encryption or vice-versa and checked
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Table 7.4: Results of the SOC testing experiment
Size Fault Original No. of Original no. of
(bytes) coverage(%) Coverage(%) Cycles Cycles
Testbench 1 7808 90.01 90.26 6700 6373
Testbench 2 9128 90.15 90.35 7816 7435
Testbench 3 10432 90.2 90.44 8932 8496
whether we ended up with original 128-bit data. We generated many such
sequences. We used these testbenches as the sequences that we need to map
for SOC testing. We mapped these test sequences into ARM instructions as
described in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2. We then simulated the entire ARM
based SOC using the instructions generated and captured the signals at the
input of the core. We fault simulated the AES core using the captured signals
using a commercially available fault simulation tool [20]. The results of the
experiment are shown in Table 7.4.
The first column in Table 7.4 gives the testbench number. We used the
three of the testbenches that we generated to validate our testing methodology.
The second column in the table gives the size of the code generated when these
testbenches were mapped to instructions using our technique. The size is given
in bytes. This size does not show the amount of code that may be necessary
to dump the register file and other values (during actual test application) so
that they might be compared against the golden values derived during the
simulation. The third column gives the amount of fault coverage achieved by
each code when simulated and fault simulated according to our methodology.
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The numbers in the fourth column give fault coverage of the original sequences
when applied directly to the AES core. We can see that the fault coverage
that we obtain is very close to the original fault coverage numbers. The fifth
and sixth columns give the number of cycles in the sequences generated by our
methodology and originally in validation sequences respectively. We can see
that our methodology increases the number of cycles by around 400 cycles on
an average because of the transactions involved in sending the data through
the Wishbone bus.
7.5 Discussion
We presented our technique for testing SOCs. Even though we have
explained our technique for an SOC, it can also be used to test a network-on-
chip (NOC). Our technique involved mapping the test/validation sequences
that may be provided by the vendor or generated by the user into software
code to be loaded onto the embedded processor. The advantage of using the
embedded processor as the test source and sink is that it avoids the need for
any modifications in the design. The code can be loaded onto the processor
by the mechanisms like JTAG or ethernet using which the SOC normally
communicates with the external environment. The methodology is highly
suitable to black-box testing of IP cores since we do not need any knowledge
of the internal logic of the IP core being tested. This is a very important
contribution considering the increasing trend towards design reuse.
The technique can also be used for grey-box or white-box cores. In those
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cases a very high coverage can be attained by using a hierarchical approach.
We can generate tests for the cores using any ATPG tool and then map them
into instructions using our technique. We showed the effectiveness of our
technique by implementing an SOC using ARM and AES cores. We had an
insignificant loss of coverage when the testbenches were mapped to software
code.
The coverage obtained by our technique highly depends on the se-
quences that we start from. This is both a pro and a con of our technique.
On one hand, this makes our technique suitable for black-box testing. On the
other hand, if the sequences are not good then the coverage obtained can be
low. One way of overcoming it is by using a hierarchical approach for even
black-box cores. We can derive a functional representation of the core based
on the description given and generate sequences that provide good coverage of
this representation (like the technique for testing processors described in [77]).




In the preceding chapters, we explained our techniques for generation
of at-speed functional tests targeting structural faults in processors and SOCs.
As detailed in Chapter 1, we have addressed an important problem that has
become even more pressing with the emerging process technologies. We ini-
tially applied our technique to target stuck-at faults and proceeded to delay
faults later. We also presented a comprehensive solution to test a SOC. We
achieved better than 90% coverage of faults. This is very useful given the fact
that at-speed functional tests with lower coverage are more effective than the
slower structural tests with higher coverage [55].
The technique that we have proposed for test generation targeting faults
in a processor is based on a hierarchical approach. The hierarchy gives this
approach quite a few advantages. It allows us to use traditional structure
based test generation techniques at the local level where the structure needs
to be used to include the fault information. It also gives us the freedom to
utilize a verification engine which is more suited to take in the instruction set
based constraints at the global level. We also introduced a feedback between
these two levels to attain higher coverage.
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We also introduced a methodology for testing non-processor cores in
SOCs. We used the intelligence of the embedded processors in SOCs for this
purpose. The technique that we explained is highly suited to test black-box
cores that are part and parcel of the design reuse paradigm. We use any vectors
that are available to test the core and map them into instructions that can be
loaded into the embedded processor. We will now discuss some of issues with
our technique and any future directions in related areas that seem promising.
8.1 Testing for stuck-at faults
We had defined the modules in the design as the boundaries for the
local level test generation in case of stuck-at faults. This facilitates using tools
that operate at the RT-Level for global mapping because the signals at module
boundaries, i.e., the module inputs and outputs, are visible both at the RT-
Level and the gate level. Our properties for test generation are also specified
at the RT-Level. We do not develop a tool from scratch, rather we use existing
tools to our advantage. In this scenario, once a RT-Level constraint solving
tool is developed and shown to work it can be harnessed for our purpose. In
fact, any tool that can take in constraints and solve them on a model can be
used in our methodology. This leaves us open to use any word level reasoning
tool or any other such developments.
One of the drawbacks of using a hierarchical approach is the fact that
local test generation does not have the knowledge of constraints while at-
tempting the test generation. We overcome this by having a feedback that
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we introduced for delay faults. The coverage we achieved for delay faults is
the lower bound on the coverage that we can obtain with the same tests for
stuck-at faults. However, even with feedback, the test generation’s effective-
ness is reduced when the local test generator keeps producing tests that are
not globally mappable. One way of overcoming this would be to extract some
of the constraints a priori and pass them to the local test generation tool.
Techniques like symbolic simulation [13] can be used for this purpose. The
model can be symbolically simulated using the instruction set and constraints
can be extracted from the trace produced. Another technique that can be
used is instruction slicing [85] that slices the RT-Level code based on the way
each instruction affects the code.
8.2 Delay faults
We have proposed a very effective technique for testing of delay defects
in a processor. We used a fault model called the improved unified fault model.
This model allows us to target the small delay defects without having to test
for all the paths in the design. However, the fault model depends on the
timing information provided by the synthesis tools. With the new process
technologies the delays in the silicon differs highly from what was projected
by the pre-silicon tools. Therefore, a fault model which takes such vagaries
into account will be a very important contribution.
A fault model based on switching activity will be an interesting ap-
proach. A path which is long according to the pre-silicon tools may not be
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that long in the design. However, any switching activity that is introduced
by a vector in pre-silicon tool will also be present in the actual silicon. The
effects such as crosstalk, delay variation due to the heat in circuit depend on
the switching activity in the regions of the circuit. Therefore, if we generate
vectors that increase the switching in various regions we might catch the paths
that affect the timing of silicon much better.
While generating tests for delay defects we used the pseudo-robustness
conditions which mimic the robustness conditions except for allowing glitches
on the side-inputs. This allows us to target more paths than what would have
been possible if robustness conditions had been used. We can further relax
this conditions in certain cases to make it non-robust so that we can get better
coverage and also get better screening tests for silicon.
8.3 Scalability and portability
One of the main questions regarding the technique is its scalability.
The scalability of the technique depends on the effectiveness of the tool being
used for global mapping. Formal verification engines have the problem of state
space explosion. It is overcome in the case of bounded model checkers (the
kind of tool that we use) by unrolling only up to a specific number of cycles.
Moreover, the kind of properties that we use to ascertain controllability is
relatively simple compared to the properties being used in the design verifica-
tion phase, mainly because the temporal implication that our properties have
is very limited. Moreover, the signals being checked in the property have a
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structural relationship since they were assigned values to test for a single fault.
This makes our technique applicable to larger designs. We can also improve
the scalability by using techniques like abstraction or slicing. Another way
for improving the scalability would be to use multiple levels of hierarchy. We
can have separate engines for test generation at the module level, cluster level
chip level that communicate with each other. These engines can also take in
different representations of the design. For example, the module level testing
can be done at gate level, the cluster level testing using RT-Level design and
the full chip testing using a C like representation.
The methodology that we have proposed is portable to any design. We
have used tools that are part of the existing design flow. The knowledge that
is required of the user is not intensive. There will be a initial setup required
when the constraints imposed by the instruction set and other related signals
are extracted. This can be done parsing through the architecture document.
This can be also be automated, which is an exciting area of future research.
8.4 SOC testing
SOC testing is a very fertile area of research which has been increasing
in importance in the past few years. We have proposed an approach highly
suited to test the black-box cores and can also be easily used for grey-box
or white-box cores with a hierarchical approach. In case of black-box cores,
the dependance on the existence of test sequences can also be avoided by an
hierarchical approach that uses test generation on a functional representation
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approach of [77] to generate the sequences.
The technique as proposed is directly applicable to test for stuck-at
faults. To target delay faults some modifications may be necessary. This is
because the clock’s absence when the core is not active will not affect stuck-at
faults but it might affect delay faults. This can be overcome by having vectors
test for delay faults only when the core is already active through previous
sequences. The proposed technique does not need to know the internals of
the core being tested, hence it can be used to test SOCs containing analog,
MEMS or any other non-digital cores that are becoming common occurrences
with the increasing trend towards heterogenous SOCs.
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